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International Taxation in an Era
of Digital Disruption: Analyzing the
Current Debate
By Itai Grinberg*

Itai Grinberg examines the global debate about the allocation
of taxing rights with respect to the taxation of cross-border
corporate income.

Abstract
The “taxation of the digital economy” is currently at the top of the global international tax policymaking agenda. A core claim some European governments are
advancing is that user data or user participation in the digital economy justifies a
gross tax on digital receipts, new profit attribution criteria, or a special formulary
apportionment factor in a future formulary regime targeted specifically at the
“digital economy.” Just a couple years ago the OECD undertook an evaluation of
whether the digital economy can (or should) be “ring-fenced” as part of the BEPS
project, and concluded that it neither can be nor should be.
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Importantly, concluding that there should be no special rules for the digital economy
does not resolve the broader question of whether the international tax system
requires reform. The practical reality appears to be that all the largest economies
have come to agree either that a) there is something wrong with the taxation of
the “digital economy,” or b) there is something more fundamentally wrong with
the structure of the current international tax system given globalization and
technological trends.
This paper is intended as a limited exploration of the second (or third, or fourth)
best. It analyzes three policy options that have been discussed in general terms in the
current global debate. First, I consider whether “user participation” justifies changing profit allocation results in the digital economy alone. I conclude that applying
the user participation concept in a manner that is limited to the digital economy
© 2019 I. GRINBERG
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is intellectually indefensible; at most it amounts to mercantilist ring-fencing. Moreover, at the technical level
user participation faces all the same challenges as more
comprehensive and principled proposals for reallocating
excess returns among jurisdictions. Second, I consider one
such comprehensive international tax reform idea, loosely
referred to by the moniker “marketing intangibles.” This
idea represents a compromise between the present transfer
pricing system and sales or destination-based reforms
to the transfer pricing regime. I conclude that splitting
taxing rights over “excess” returns between the present

transfer pricing system and a destination-based approach
is complex, creates new sources of potential conflict, and
requires relatively extensive tax harmonization. This
conclusion applies equally to user participation and marketing intangibles. If such a mechanism were nevertheless
pursued, I suggest that a formulary system for splitting the
excess return is the most manageable approach. Third, I
consider “minimum effective taxation” ideas. I conclude
that, as compared to the other two policy options discussed
herein, minimum effective taxation provides a preferable
path for multilateral cooperation.
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Introduction
For the University of Chicago Federal Tax Conference in
November 2018, I was asked to write a paper “discussing
what the U.S. position should be and how the U.S. tax
rules should be changed (or not) in reaction to European
tax changes such as the proposed gross tax on digital
receipts, the digital PE, and the diverted profits tax.”
A core tax policy claim some European governments
are advancing is that user data or user participation in the
digital economy justifies a gross tax on digital receipts,
new profit attribution criteria, or a special formulary
apportionment (“FA”) factor in a future formulary
regime. One fundamental question these claims raise
is whether there is anything unique about the digital
economy. In the BEPS project the OECD undertook an
evaluation of whether the digital economy can (or should)
be “ring-fenced,” and concluded that it neither can be nor
should be. But the OECD’s conclusion is not stopping
some European governments from pursuing proposals
that attempt to apply special tax regimes to a limited set
of digital businesses.1
Importantly, simply concluding that there should be no
special rules for the digital economy does not resolve the
broader question of whether the international tax system
requires reform prompted in part by the digitalization
of the economy. Indeed, a debate about this question is
ongoing at the OECD. We know more about the contours
of that debate today than we did when I was first asked
to undertake this paper. The practical reality appears
to be that all the largest economies have come to agree
either that a) there is something wrong with the taxation
of the “digital economy,” or b) there is something more
fundamentally wrong with the structure of the current
international tax system in an era of globalization and
digitalization.2 Government representatives have now
made this plain in multiple public forums. So, one way
or the other, we lack a stable status quo.3
This paper sets out some considerations for U.S. international tax policymaking and international tax diplomacy
in this uncertain environment. To that end, Part I briefly
describes four disparate background considerations that
should inform our thinking. Part IA describes the decline
of the arm’s-length standard, which underpinned our
historic understandings about how to attribute profits
as among entities within a multinational corporation
(“MNC”). I argue that internationally the arm’s-length
standard as we knew it before the BEPS project is largely
gone, and has been replaced by an unsustainable concept
for profit attribution that I label the bourgeois labor theory
of value (“BLTV”). Part IB describes the relationship
MARCH 2019

between the arm’s-length standard, jurisdiction to tax,
and the attribution of profits to permanent establishments
(“PE”). It highlights that under OECD principles, attribution of profits to PEs is accomplished through application
of the OECD’s transfer pricing guidelines (“TPG”). Part
IC recounts various acts of tax unilateralism abroad, often
focused on the tech sector, and including the trend toward
abandoning historic limits on jurisdiction to tax. Part ID
describes the United States’ 2017 tax reform in that global
context, with a particular focus on the global intangible
low-taxed income (“GILTI”) and the BEAT.
The remainder of the paper is intended as an exploration of the second (or third, or fourth) best. For purposes
of this paper, I therefore do not analyze options that
were considered and rejected in the most recent U.S. tax
reform, including a destination-based cash flow tax or an
integrated corporate tax system, and certain options that
never made it into the most recent tax reform debate, such
as adopting a VAT.
The discussion is instead limited to three options that
have been discussed in general terms in the current global
debate. Each of these options preserves a classic corporate
tax system that includes an entity-level tax on the normal
return to capital. One further important caveat is that
in this paper I attempt as best I can to fill in ideas that
have been described with a very high level of generality
with additional potential content, in order to motivate
the analysis.
Part II focuses on the European Commission and Her
Majesty’s Treasury (“HMT”) stated view that user participation should be acknowledged as a source of value
creation in the digital economy and concludes that the
user participation concept has application well beyond
the so-called digital economy. Applying the concept in
a manner that is limited to the digital economy is intellectually indefensible; at most it amounts to mercantilist
ring-fencing.
The user participation theory does, however, have an
important relationship to other more generally applicable
proposals for international tax reform. In particular, it
involves a shift toward destination-based income taxation, in much the same manner as some other proposals
for fundamental international income allocation reform,
albeit only for one sector.
At least two more comprehensive and principled proposals to reform the international tax system’s attribution
of profits are apparently now being considered at the
OECD. These respectively are often loosely referred to
by the monikers “marketing intangibles” and “minimum
taxation.” As publicly described, these ideas seem to be at
an early stage of development.
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Part III evaluates a version of the “marketing intangibles”
idea which I label the destination-based residual market
profit allocation (“DBRMPA”). Part IV evaluates a version of a minimum tax system that combines inbound
and outbound measures, and which I label “minimum
effective taxation.”

Part IV postulates that there may be a more sensible path
for multilateral cooperation around minimum effective
taxation. This approach could be both responsive to the
current global international tax debate and build on (and
help repair) our 2017 international tax reform. I conclude
that a minimum effective taxation approach would be
preferable to a DBRMPA.

Importantly, simply concluding that
there should be no special rules for
the digital economy does not resolve
the broader question of whether the
international tax system requires
reform prompted in part by the
digitalization of the economy. Indeed,
a debate about this question is
ongoing at the OECD.

I. Background

Part III builds on the discussion about “where we go
from here” in transfer pricing provided by Andrus and
Oosterhuis in a paper for the 2016 University of Chicago
conference. The DBRMPA is related to that conference
discussion of two years ago. In particular, it represents a
compromise between the present transfer pricing system
and sales or destination-based reforms to the transfer
pricing system described in the Andrus/Oosterhuis paper.
Part III concludes that splitting taxing rights over “excess”
returns4 between the present transfer pricing system and a
destination-based approached is complex. It creates new
sources of potential conflict as between sovereigns and as
between sovereigns and multinationals. Moreover, some
destination specification problems for which solutions
do not exist or at least are not widely known would need
to be addressed. Finally, the DBRMPA likely requires
extensive tax harmonization and information exchange;
more so than a minimum tax approach. Importantly all of
the above conclusions regarding a DBRMPA apply with
equal rigor as technical critiques of user participation. The
difference is simply that a DBRMPA applies to the whole
economy and therefore—unlike user participation—has
some principled basis. If a DBRMPA were pursued, Part
III suggests that a formulary mechanism for doing so is
the least technically challenging approach.
Part IV builds on the discussion of the GILTI and the
BEAT in Part I as well as other discussions of the pros and
cons of those provisions in tax forums over the last year.
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A. The Decline of the Arm’s-Length Standard
Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention is intended
to ensure that MNCs do not obtain inappropriate tax
advantages by pricing transactions within the group differently than independent enterprises would do at “arm’s
length.” More than half of world trade is now intra-firm.5
Thus, more than half of world trade is subject to transfer
pricing.
Under the arm’s-length principle, multinational groups
are supposed to divide their income for tax purposes among
affiliates in the different countries in which the MNC does
business, in a way that is meant to emulate the results that
would transpire if the transactions had occurred between
independent enterprises.6 For most of the last 40 years, the
arm’s-length principle represented a consensual solution
reached among technicians for the problem of allocating tax
between different parts of an MNC.7 Although the mantra
of “arm’s length” masked real disagreement, and members
of the transfer pricing practitioner community often held
the view that there was substantial controversy as to the
proper implementation of the arm’s-length standard, the
range of interpretation was, in practice, reasonably narrow. Major transfer pricing disputes arose with regularity,
but they were addressed within a framework that largely
respected intercompany contracts and the concept of allocation of risk within a multinational group.8
In the last decade, however, the “arm’s-length standard”
became extraordinarily controversial.9 Transfer pricing
even became the subject of contentious discussion among
high-level elected officials with no tax expertise at all.10
Moreover, the so-called “stateless income”11 narrative
became commonly accepted by tax policymakers in almost
every developed economy.
As a result, preexisting norms developed by the community of transfer pricing specialists came under heavy
and perhaps deserving scrutiny. Views around the level of
deference to be given to intergroup contractual arrangements in transfer pricing analyses diverged substantially,
the consensus on the scope for recharacterizing intergroup
transactions frayed, the consensus on respecting intergroup equity contributions declined. Disputes among
MARCH 2019

government officials about whether value creation in crossborder transactions undertaken by multinationals should
be attributed to capital, labor, the market, user participation, or government support are now aired routinely.12
Enormous political pressures coming from the highest
levels of government and the G-20 meant that some sort
of outcome on transfer pricing was politically necessary
as part of the BEPS project.13 Thus, in 2015, the BEPS
project in effect endorsed the commonly held idea that
the then-existing OECD TPG were broken. However, at
the technical level bureaucrats failed to reach meaningful
consensus on a clearly delineated alternative. The result
was a reliance on high levels of constructive ambiguity
buried in many pages of technocratic language in the
transfer pricing outputs of the BEPS project.14
One phrase that captures this ambiguity is the commitment to “align income taxation with value creation.”
Everyone agrees on the principle—but no one agrees what
it means.15
Nevertheless, if there was one central theme to the BEPS
transfer pricing guidance taken as a whole, it was to put
great weight for purposes of allocating intangible income
and income associated with the contractual allocation of
risk on “people functions.” The people functions of interest
were activities by people who are of sufficiently high skill
to engage in the development, enhancement, maintenance,
protection, and exploitation of intangibles (the so-called
“DEMPE functions”) as well as to be able to control financial risks, including those associated with the employment of
intangibles. It is these people functions that the post-BEPS
TPG treat as “meriting” the allocation of excess returns from
intangibles. In contrast, contractual or legal ownership of
an intangible is not particularly significant, nor is “routine”
labor.16 I call this approach to transfer pricing the BLTV.
The labor theory of value asserts that the value of a good
or service is fully dependent upon the labor used in its
production. This theory was an important lynchpin in
the philosophical ideas of Karl Marx. In contrast, conventional capitalist economic theory relies on a theory of
marginalism, in which the value of any good or service is
thought to be determined by its marginal utility. Moreover,
the pricing of a good or service is based on a relationship
between that marginal utility, and the marginal productivity of all the factors of production required to produce
the relevant good or service. In addition to labor, a key
factor of production required to produce most goods and
services is capital—including real and intangible assets
purchased with capital.
The BLTV attributes profits quite heavily to the labor of
certain highly educated workers who occupy upper middle
management roles—roles and backgrounds broadly similar
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to those who negotiate transfer pricing rules for governments. The theoretical basis in economics for this BEPS
transfer pricing settlement is unclear. It turns the Marxian
labor theory of value on its head while being inconsistent
with the conventional economic view, too. To my mind
this feature makes it even less coherent than other possible
bases for transfer pricing.

However, the digitization of the
economy does force policymakers
to confront a basic choice between
destination-based corporate income
taxation and residence-based
corporate income taxation.
In the 2013 to 2015 period, the BLTV clearly seemed
like an attractive alternative theory to various government
officials. It addressed the “cash box” problem of multinational income being parked in zero tax places like the
Cayman Islands and Bermuda, while attributing income to
what the relevant officials viewed as “meaningful” activity.
However, the post-BEPS BLTV version of the OECD’s
TPG, if implemented in good faith by tax administrations around the world, would effectively provide that an
MNC can in various situations save hundreds of millions
or even billions of dollars by moving 20 or a 100 key jobs
to a low-tax jurisdiction from a high-tax jurisdiction. And
many of those jurisdictions—Switzerland, Ireland, and
increasingly the UK—are attractive places to live, with
talented, high-skill labor pools already in place.
Requiring that DEMPE activities be conducted in
tax-favorable jurisdictions in order to justify income
allocations to those jurisdictions encourages DEMPE
jobs to move to those jurisdictions. This transfer pricing
result—that income may be shifted by moving highskilled jobs—is deeply geopolitically unstable. From the
corporate perspective, there can be huge incentives to shift
DEMPE jobs if enough tax liability rides on the decision. At the same time, large developed economies with
higher tax rates simply will not accept an arrangement
that sees them losing both tax revenue and headquarters
and R&D jobs.
In providing the above critique regarding the BEPS
transfer pricing settlement, I do not wish to be misunderstood. Outside the transfer pricing area (BEPS Actions
8–10), I believe the BEPS project had many notable
accomplishments. Global best practices and minimum
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standards were developed with respect to important
issues like hybridity, interest expense deductions, information reporting, and more. The BEPS project certainly
showed how soft law in the international tax space can
be quite efficacious. But transfer pricing is sufficiently
important that the failure to reach a sensible result in
this space casts a shadow over the BEPS project generally.
The failure to grapple in a sensible way with the questions raised by transfer pricing is one important reason
the post-BEPS environment is characterized by much
of the global tax chaos the BEPS project was supposed
to prevent.17

B. The Relationship Between the Arm’sLength Standard, Jurisdiction to Tax,
and the Attribution of Profits to PEs
Tax treaties specify when an enterprise based in one state
has a sufficient connection to another state to justify
taxation by the latter state. Under Article 5 of the OECD
Model Tax Convention, a sufficient connection exists
when an enterprise resident in one state (the “residence
state”) has a “permanent establishment” in another state
(the “source state”). The PE threshold must be met before
the source state may tax that enterprise on active business
income properly attributable to the enterprise’s activity
in the source state. The PE rule encapsulated in Article 5
thus represents the basic international standard governing
jurisdiction to tax a non-resident enterprise.

A shift from our residence-based
system to a destination-based
corporate income tax, if agreed to
by the major economies, is certainly
a viable option.

Under Article 7 of the OECD’s Model Tax Convention,
profits attributable to a PE are those that the PE would
have derived if it were a separate and independent enterprise performing the activities which cause it to be a PE.18
In 2010, the OECD issued a report on the attribution of
profits to PEs. The report concluded that a PE should be
treated as if it were distinct and separate from its overseas
head office; and that assets and risks should be attributed
to the PE or the head office in line with the location of
“significant people functions.”
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The post-2010 OECD approach to attributing profits to a PE is commonly referred to as the Authorized
OECD Approach (“AOA”).19 This approach is based on
the adoption of the 2010 version of the business profits
article (Article 7) of the OECD Model Tax Convention.
Step one of the AOA leads to the recognition of internal
dealings between the PE and its head office.20 Then, under
step two, the guidance in the OECD’s TPG is applied
by analogy to determine the arm’s-length pricing of the
internal dealing between the PE and the head office.21 The
2010 report on the AOA made clear that as the TPG were
modified in the future, the AOA should be applied “by
taking into account the guidance in the Guidelines as so
modified from time to time.”22
In the BEPS project, many countries focused on the
idea that technological progress (especially the Internet)
and the globalization of business have made it easier to be
heavily involved in the economic life of another jurisdiction without meeting the historic PE threshold. In the end
the BEPS project produced some notable changes to the
PE threshold.23 These changes to Article 5 of the OECD
Model Tax Convention are now being transposed into the
global tax treaty network via the multilateral instrument,
which itself represents another success of the BEPS project. Importantly, however, the BEPS project concluded
that the AOA did not need to be revisited in light of the
changes to Article 5.
Fundamentally, the AOA was developed because if associated enterprises in different countries were taxed under
the arm’s-length standard under Article 9, but PEs were
taxed under some other rule under Article 7, distortions
between structures involving PEs and structures involving
subsidiaries would arise. As a result, the OECD Model
Tax Convention attempts to apply the TPG and the arm’slength principle as consistently as possible in both cases.24
Applying the AOA means that the PE and its head office
are treated like independent enterprises. Note, however,
that modern tax treaty PE tests are built to a significant
degree on an underlying idea of dependence that differs
from dependence/independence of ownership.25 Thus,
the AOA taxes a PE as if the PE and its head office are
independent enterprises, but by definition a dependent
agent PE requires dependence. This paradox is a product
of the decision to have the transfer pricing rules trump the
PE rules and make the arm’s-length standard the central
organizing principle.26 As a result, in our current legal
construct, discussing the attribution of profits to a PE
requires discussing which rules we wish to use to allocate
MNE profits generally.
The alternative to the dependency criteria for establishing the existence of a PE is physical presence. Arguably,
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that mechanism for establishing a PE is just a proxy for
meaningful presence in the economic life of a jurisdiction through dependent agents. Historically the physical
presence rule was also a pragmatic administrative consideration. The physical presence of either an enterprise or a
dependent agent of the enterprise was necessary in order
to collect tax revenues from a taxpayer. Today, however,
the pragmatic consideration is much less important in
business-to-business transactions, given the development
of reverse-charging type mechanisms and the ability
to require a resident business to withhold from a nonresident. Moreover, in the Internet era, it seems to me
a losing argument to suggest that large digital firms do
not have a meaningful global presence. So the principled
debate with respect to jurisdiction to tax and attribution
of profits to PEs is just the debate about how to allocate
the profits of an MNE among jurisdictions generally.27

C. The Rise of International Tax
Unilateralism and the Push to Tax Big Tech

Many jurisdictions decided quite quickly that they were
not satisfied with the BEPS transfer pricing outcomes, at
least with respect to specific companies or sectors where
they wished to collect more revenue. The marquee actor
in this story is the United Kingdom.
In 2015, before the BEPS project had ended, the United
Kingdom imposed a 25% tax on profits deemed to be
artificially diverted away from the UK. The Diverted Profit
Tax (“DPT”) targets instances where, under existing PE
rules, an MNC legitimately avoids a UK taxable presence, despite the fact that the MNC is supplying goods
or services to UK customers. The UK took the position
that the DPT was not covered by the United Kingdom’s
income tax treaties, and therefore that the PE rules tax
treaties specify as to when a state has jurisdiction to tax an
enterprise based in another state did not apply to the DPT.
The primary justification for OECD countries recommending and the G-20 launching the BEPS project had
been to develop rules-based multilateral reforms that
would prevent unilateral actions by the countries participating in the BEPS project. The UK adopted the DPT at
the same time that it was helping lead the BEPS project.
The UK’s decision both to lead a multilateral project that
was supposed to set internationally agreed rules that would
prevent inconsistent unilateral action, and at the same time
unilaterally adopt the DPT, a tax that was not consistent
with BEPS, was broadly perceived as a significant blow to
tax multilateralism. The decision treated sovereignty as a
license for organized hypocrisy. But for the DPT, one could
imagine that a more cooperative international tax environment might have evolved out of the BEPS project.28
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Under the DPT, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
(“HMRC”) can choose which companies it wishes to
pursue and to what degree.29 Thus, the DPT also struck
a blow against non-discrimination principles in international taxation. Indeed, in press interviews UK government officials referred to the DPT simply as the “Google
Tax.”30 The extent to which the DPT is an arbitrary levy
on targets of interest to HMRC is well-illustrated by the
12-fold increase in revenues raised by the DPT between
2015/2016 and 2017/2018.31 Twelve-fold increases in
revenue without a change in the rate or rules simply do
not happen when tax law functions in the normal way.32

What analyzing the DBRMPA
highlights is that compromise
between a destination-based income
tax and a residence-based corporate
income tax, even principled
compromise, is hard to administer.
Splitting the baby is probably
unwise. If policymakers wish for a
destination-based income tax, they
should really try to go all the way
there.
Following the UK’s lead, by late 2017, countries as
diverse as Australia, Argentina, Chile, France, India, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, and
Uruguay had taken unilateral actions not limited by or
consistent with the BEPS agreements. These measures are
generally designed to increase levels of inbound corporate
income taxation. Many are structured so that, as a practical
matter, they primarily affect U.S. MNCs. Among other
examples, in 2016 Australia enacted a DPT-like measure
with a 40% tax rate (also publicly known as the “Google
Tax”). India imposed a 6% “equalization levy” on outbound payments to non-resident companies for digital
advertising services. India’s legislation authorized extending the tax to all digital services by administrative action.
The Israel Tax Authority announced an interpretation of
Israeli law that significantly reduces the level of physical
presence necessary for direct taxation of non-resident
digital companies. The Korean government is considering amendments to the Korean Corporate Tax Act to
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override Korean tax treaties and treat “global information
and communications technology companies” as having a
digital Korean PE. Uruguay has enacted, and Argentina is
considering, measures similar to those adopted in India.
During this same time period the Directorate-General for
Competition (“DG Comp”) at the European Commission
reconceptualized its “state aid” concept in the international
tax context, notably by claiming that DG Comp was not
limited by the OECD’s arm’s-length standard in determining whether tax rulings were consistent with EU law.33
More recently, governments around the world have been
proposing or enacting taxes targeted specifically at digital
advertising and online platforms. India went first with its
previously-mentioned tax on digital advertising. Then, in
September 2017, the European Commission called for
new international rules that would alter the application
of PE and transfer pricing rules for the digital economy
alone.34 Moreover, the Commission argued that until such
time as a digital-specific reform of the international tax
system was agreed upon, an interim tax based on turnover, or a withholding mechanism, should be imposed on
digital platform companies.35 The UK followed up on the
Commission’s digital tax proposals with its own position
paper on corporation tax and the digital economy.36 On
October 29, 2018, the UK announced the introduction
of a “digital services tax” that is based on turnover and is
explicitly ring-fenced to hit only large search engine, social
media, and online marketplace businesses.37 Other unilateral measures focusing on the digital economy have been
taken by India (significant economic presence PE),38 Israel
(digital PE), and others. Like the earlier round of unilateral
measures, some of these proposals have been described
both in government documents and in the media as
taxes targeting “GAFA:” Google, Apple, Facebook, and
Amazon. However, the proposals generally are structured
to have an impact beyond those four corporations.
Separately, in 2017 Germany adopted its “Act against
Harmful Tax Practices with regard to Licensing of Rights.”
New section 4j of the German Income Tax Act restricts
deductions for royalties and similar payments made to
related parties if such payments are subject to a nonOECD compliant preferential tax regime and are taxed at
an effective rate below 25%.39 The provision also includes
a conduit rule along the same general lines as U.S. code
provision section 7701(l).40
In 2017 the UK also opened consultations on a royalty
withholding tax proposal, which is now scheduled to be
enacted and in force from April 6, 2019.41 This withholding tax would generally apply where a non-UK entity
making sales in the UK does not have a taxable presence
in the UK. Withholding is also extended to payments for
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the right to distribute goods or perform specified services
in the UK. Since there is no UK entity making a payment,
the proposal applies almost exclusively to cases where a
non-UK company selling to UK customers pays a royalty
to a 3rd country jurisdiction. HMT describes the proposal
as a step to tax the digital economy, but acknowledges
that it has application beyond the digital sector. For
example, imagine a Brazilian MNC has a subsidiary in
Ireland making sales in the UK and paying a royalty to
an entity in the Cayman Islands. Under these proposals,
the UK would be trying to withhold from the royalty
paid from Ireland to the Cayman Islands. The proposal
thus raises the enforcement issues raised in the canonical
SDI Netherlands case.
Realistically, more unilateral measures to increase source
country taxation, market country taxation, or both are
coming. These changes are likely to be somewhat uncoordinated, and sometimes unprincipled. Moreover, these
moves toward source or market country taxation are
likely to affect “old-line” businesses as well as the digital
sector. Tax directors of multinationals in a wide range of
industries already highlight that the label “BEPS” is used
to justify a wide range of source-country tax adjustments
that produce significant tax controversies.
Historically the multilateral international tax architecture was focused on residence country taxation. The
international tax architecture around the world appears
to be shifting toward more source-based or destinationbased taxation, but that transition is turning out to be
very messy. The strategic questions for the United States
created by this unsettled state of international tax affairs
featured prominently in the final round of discussions
about U.S. international tax reform.42

D. U.S. Tax Reform, the BEAT and the GILTI
By the time of the 2016 elections, there was widespread consensus that the United States needed to
reform its aberrant international corporate tax system.
Commentators called for a lower corporate tax rate,
and a move away from a deferral system and toward
the dividend exemption systems that had become an
international norm. Other countries had been taking
these steps for years, while also increasing their reliance
on consumption taxes and decreasing their reliance on
corporate income taxes.
Nevertheless, at the outset of 2017, few commentators
thought the U.S. political system would successfully bring
a tax reform package to fruition. Then, as we all know, the
United States surprised the world by enacting tax reform.
The international corporate component of the reform was
labeled as a shift to a “territorial” regime. However, the
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law enacted actually moved the United States closer to
a current worldwide tax system for outbound taxation,
instantiated in a regime now known as the “GILTI.” At
the same time, the United States followed the global trend
in enacting unilateral measures intended to strengthen
inbound taxation. The United States did so by adopting
the “base erosion anti-abuse tax” in new section 59A of
the Code (“BEAT”).
The GILTI is the main subject of Dana Trier’s conference
paper and the panel immediately preceding the presentation of this paper at the conference. Therefore, I will
not go to any great lengths to describe the GILTI here.
Practitioners have also written about the various twists and
turns of the BEAT, and I do not propose to reconstruct
the full breadth of that discussion, either. Nevertheless,
for the sake of completeness a brief background on these
provisions is appropriate.
1. GILTI. Code Sec. 951A requires each U.S. shareholder
of a controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”) to include
currently in its gross income its share of GILTI for the year.
In very general terms, GILTl refers to a U.S. shareholder’s
share of a CFC’s income above a 10% return on qualified business asset investment (“QBAI”) with respect to
everything other than five enumerated categories of CFC
income. Those categories are effectively connected income,
subpart F income, income that would be subpart F income
but for the Code Sec. 954(b)(4) high-tax kickout, certain
intercompany dividends, and foreign oil and gas extraction income. A U.S. shareholder of a CFC includes in
income its GILTI in a manner similar to the inclusion
mechanism for subpart F income. GILTI is eligible for
a 50% deduction under Code Sec. 250 (through 2025).
Therefore, a minimum effective U.S. tax rate of 10.5%
applies to all GILTI earnings of CFCs of U.S. shareholders. Special rules apply regarding foreign taxes associated
with GILTI. Very generally, if a U.S. shareholder that is
a domestic corporation elects to take foreign tax credits
for a taxable year, all of the foreign taxes associated with
GILTI are included in its income as a deemed dividend
under Code Sec. 78. However, only 80% of these foreign
taxes are allowed as deemed paid foreign tax credits in the
new GILTI foreign tax credit basket.43
The New York State Bar Association (“NYSBA”)
observes that the GILTI can be understood conceptually as a hybrid between “a flat minimum domestic and
foreign tax rate on a U.S. shareholder’s GILTI inclusions
not associated with QBAI (the ‘flat rate theory’) and the
imperfect adding of the GILTI regime onto the subpart
F regime (the ‘add-on theory’).”44 One’s understanding
of which theory should dominate can influence many
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regulatory decisions. But no matter how one thinks about
the regime enacted in the statute (or how the regulations
are written), the regime will generally produce at least a
minimum 10.5% combined domestic and foreign tax on
a U.S. shareholder’s GILTI not attributable to QBAI.45
Moreover, given that the concerns in international tax
policy are overwhelmingly intangible income-driven, and
that the digital sector is “tangible asset light,” ignoring
QBAI constitutes a reasonable first-order simplification
for purposes of this paper.
Finally, it should be noted that most of the complexity
entailed by the international tax regulations now being
issued by the U.S. Treasury in this area are the product of
the QBAI concept, the foreign tax credit basketing system
enacted for GILTI, and the legislative design decision to
layer a shareholder-level calculation on top of entity-level
concepts. None of these features is inherent in or essential
to enacting a flat rate minimum tax policy.46
2. The Relationship Between GILTI and the Digital Tax
Debate. The consequences of GILTI for the international
tax debate in the “digital” space should have been profound. When the BEPS project began, the digital economy
was a special area of focus because it was considered an
important case of so-called “stateless income.”47
Following the 2017 legislation, the minimum tax rates
on foreign earnings achievable for U.S.-headquartered
firms have changed. Speaking generally, an intangible
driven U.S.-parented multinational simply will not be
able to achieve an effective tax rate on their foreign earnings that is below 10.5%. An effective rate of 10.5% for
corporate shareholders (after taking into account the 50%
deduction described above) is comparatively unfavorable
to the CFC regimes of most of the major trading partners
of the United States, which typically tax CFC earnings in
relatively limited circumstances. As a practical matter the
consequence is that BEPS leading to stateless income—
the original driver for the entire international tax reform
debate—is now a phenomenon that exists only for nonU.S. headquartered multinationals.
Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, the four companies specifically targeted in documents issued at various
points by the Commission, the French government, and
the German coalition agreement, each face a 10.5%
minimum tax on their foreign earnings. Since every EU
member state has a dividend exemption system that does
not include a minimum tax, and instead provides a 0%
tax rate on foreign earnings when repatriated, companies
like Volkswagen, Allianz, Daimler, Siemens in Germany,
or BNP Paribas and Carrefour in France do not face a
minimum tax burden on their foreign earnings. They
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can, and in some circumstances still do, generate stateless
income and achieve 0% tax on their foreign earnings. That
is the reality of current U.S. corporate tax law as compared
with the current corporate tax law of the largest continuing members of the EU. Meanwhile, the UK’s corporate
tax reforms beginning in 2012 were explicitly designed to
ensure the ability of UK-headquartered multinationals to
achieve a zero rate of tax on foreign earnings by generally
exempting those earnings from UK tax.
Therefore, when the Commission or HMT now propose a solution for the digital sector, that proposal is not
about addressing low-taxed income or leveling an unlevel
playing field—the justifications given for rule changes in
BEPS just a few years ago. Rather, the proposals are now
clearly about a revenue shift to move tax revenue from
jurisdictions of residence to the jurisdictions where digital
companies have users.48
3. BEAT. The BEAT was enacted to address legislative
concerns that the former U.S. international tax regime
made foreign ownership of almost any asset or business
more attractive than U.S. ownership from a tax perspective, thereby creating tax-driven incentives for foreign
takeovers of U.S. firms and foreign acquisition of business units previously owned by U.S. MNCs and financial
pressures that encourage U.S. MNCs to “invert” (move
their headquarters abroad), produce abroad for the U.S.
market, and shift business income to low-tax jurisdictions
abroad. Until recently, little policy attention was given
to reining in the benefits that U.S. law gives to inbound
multinationals that make foreign status more attractive
than domestic status. In this regard the United States
was a global outlier: in the rest of the world, governments
have been focusing their policy efforts almost exclusively
on inbound taxpayers that minimize their income in
local jurisdictions since the onset of the financial crisis.
With the BEAT, the United States took a bold but highly
imperfect step to join the global consensus that inbound
must be addressed.
New section 59A of the Code imposes an additional
tax equal to the “base erosion minimum tax amount” (the
“BEAT tax”) of “applicable taxpayers.”49 The BEAT tax
generally means “the excess (if any) of an amount equal
to 10 percent … of the modified taxable income of such
taxpayer for the taxable year, over an amount equal to
the regular tax liability … of the taxpayer for the taxable
year, reduced (but not below zero) by [certain credits].”50
In other words, the BEAT tax is calculated as the difference between the corporation’s regular tax liability and an
alternative calculation based on the corporation’s modified
taxable income.
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Modified taxable income for BEAT tax purposes is generally defined as taxable income computed without regard
to any deduction with respect to a payment to a foreign
related party.51 Certain exceptions (notably for certain
payments for services) apply. Payments for cost of goods
sold (“COGS”) also have no effect on the calculation of
modified taxable income because, as a technical matter,
COGS are a reduction in gross receipts (rather than a
deductible payment).52 The characterization of payments,
especially with respect to transactions involving bundled
services and goods, can therefore affect whether a payment
is within the scope of the BEAT provision. The BEAT’s
“modified taxable income” base is also determined without
regard to the base erosion percentage of any net operating
loss (“NOL”) allowed for the tax year.
Only “applicable taxpayers” are subject to the BEAT
at all. To be an applicable taxpayer, a U.S. corporation
and its affiliates53 must meet certain criteria.54 Notably,
the U.S. corporation generally must have a “base erosion
percentage” of 3% or higher. This base erosion percentage
is generally determined by dividing the aggregate amount
of a taxpayer’s “base erosion tax benefits” for the taxable
year, by the sum of the aggregate amount of the deductions allowable to the taxpayer, plus certain base erosion
tax benefits allowable to the taxpayer.
The BEAT has been the subject of cogent critiques by
the NYSBA and other commentators.55 The key BEAT
complications for purposes of this discussion relate to
the treatment of foreign tax credits and the base erosion
percentage concept. In my view, these two features of the
BEAT should be removed.
Most tax credits are disregarded in determining regular
tax liability for purposes of the BEAT calculation.56 Most
importantly, foreign tax credits are disregarded. The treatment of foreign tax credits under the BEAT disfavors
foreign taxes paid by BEAT taxpayers relative to any other
business expense. In other words, foreign taxes are in
effect not even deductible for BEAT taxpayers. In various
circumstances, the rule disregarding the value of foreign
tax credits for purposes of measuring hypothetical regular
tax liability increases the BEAT minimum tax dollar for
dollar.57 Foreign taxes paid by U.S. MNCs are thus treated
almost as if they were equivalent to bribes and payments
made to entities in Iran and North Korea. This treatment
is not justifiable. Moreover, disallowing foreign tax credits
has no clear relationship to base erosion.
Second, if a taxpayer’s “base erosion percentage” is 3%
or less, they are not subject to the BEAT. The base erosion percentage is generally determined by dividing the
aggregate amount of “base erosion tax benefits” of the
taxpayer for the taxable year, by the sum of the aggregate
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amount of the deductions allowable to the taxpayer plus
certain other tax benefits allowable to the taxpayer. Since
both the numerator and denominator of the base erosion
percentage fraction represent gross rather than net concepts, the rule is highly manipulable, and the cliff feature
encourages manipulation.
Importantly, the BEAT includes a broad grant of regulatory authority to the Treasury. The provision includes
specific authority to prescribe such regulations as may
be necessary or appropriate. The BEAT also includes a
number of specific grants of regulatory authority. These
include providing “for such adjustments to the application
of this section as are necessary to prevent the avoidance of
the purposes of this section, including through” the use
of unrelated persons, conduit transactions, other intermediaries, or transactions designed in whole or in part to
characterize payments otherwise subject to the BEAT as
not subject to the BEAT, or (quite extraordinarily) even
regulations preventing taxpayers from obtaining benefits
from substituting payments not subject to the BEAT
as drafted with payments that would normally not be
subject to the BEAT.58 The intent behind the scope of
this remarkable grant of specific regulatory authority is
not discussed in the legislative history. Nevertheless, the
language is sufficiently expansive as to raise the question
of whether Congress intended the BEAT to give Treasury
authority to reconsider allocation of profits generally for
minimum tax purposes.

II. Value Creation and User
Participation59

Academic commentators of all ideological stripes have now
explained in multiple articles that the international tax
system is not now, and never has been, based on a value
creation principle.60 Moreover, as I suggested in Part IA,
no one entirely knows or agrees on the precise meaning of
“value creation.” Finally, the consensus academic view is
that any exercise to define specific sources of value creation
is entirely subjective.61
Nevertheless, post-BEPS, various governments often
repeat the mantra that “the international tax framework
is based on a principle that the profits of a business should
be taxed in the countries in which it creates value.”62 One
proposal that features prominently among “value creationists” is known by the label “user participation.” It purports
to give appropriate credit to user participation in value
creation in the digital economy. This idea originated from
HMT, was then taken up by the European Commission,
and is now being studied by the OECD.
HMT and the European Commission both maintain
there is something distinctive about value creation in the
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digital economy. They focus on the example of a user
uploading data on a social media platform to illustrate
the importance of user participation in the digital space.
The Commission argues that in this case user participation contributes to value creation because users’ “data
will later be used and monetised for targeted advertising.
The profits are not necessarily taxed in the country of the
user (and viewer of the advert), but rather in the country
where the advertising algorithms has been developed,
for example. This means that the user contribution to
the profits is not taken into account when the company
is taxed.”63
HMT and the Commission also assert there is something special about online marketplaces and other “collaborative platforms,” that “generates revenue through
matching suppliers and purchasers of a good,” or “charges
a commission for bringing together supply and demand for
assets and possessions owned by individuals. The success
of those businesses is reliant on the active involvement of
users on either side of the intermediated market and the
expansion of that user base to allow the business to benefit from network effects, economies of scale and market
power.”64 In contrast, HMT claims participation of users
in non-digital businesses is generally “passive.”
Two immediate questions arise with respect to the
user participation theory put forth by HMT and the
Commission. The first question is whether there is any
reason to believe that users only meaningfully contribute
to value creation in the context of certain digital platforms.
The second is how, across the whole of the economy, one
would determine when users contribute to value creation,
and to what degree.
If user participation is a meaningful concept, it cannot
be rationally limited to information communication technologies. Consider a clinical trial from a user participation
perspective: such trials involve a corporation giving thousands of individuals free medicine over a period of years in
exchange for those users providing deeply personal medical
data, as well as a service to the company—the use of their
bodies for purposes of experimentation. The resulting
data is monetized by obtaining a patent and customizing
products to specific diseases and patient populations. This
user data is also required for regulatory approvals, without
which the company may not sell anything at all.
The data provided by patients is deeply private biometric
and health information. In this sense, the data users provide in exchange for free products in the medical economy
is often substantially more extensive and personal than the
data that a digital user provides. Moreover, their engagement with the providers of their treatment is often more
sustained than a digital user of a social media platform.
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After all, in some cases disengaging from the company
(ceasing to supply data in exchange for treatment) might
fundamentally impact a drug user’s health. In sum, both
active user participation and data contribution appear to
be part of the medical economy.
The most meaningful objection to the above analogy
between user participation in the digital economy and user
participation in the medical economy relates to the fact
that the medical economy generally does not benefit from
either “multisided business models” or network effects.
Indeed Commission, HMT, and OECD documents each
often highlight these two economic phenomena in describing potential justifications for a special profit allocation
for user participation in the digital economy.65
Neither multisided business models nor network effects
are new economic phenomena, nor are those phenomena
limited to the digital platform businesses affected by user
participation proposals. Multisided platform businesses
are generally defined as businesses that a) offer distinct
products or services, b) to different groups of customers, c) whom a “platform” connects, d) in simultaneous
transactions. In simpler terms, they are market makers—
businesses that help unrelated parties get together to
exchange value. Network effects refer to the phenomenon
whereby a product or service gains additional value as
more people use it.
Before the advent of the Internet, the classic example of
a multisided business model with network effects used in
economics discussions involved financial intermediation.
Credit card businesses represent one example. On one
side of the business consumers are offered convenience
and financing, and on the other side merchants obtain
a mechanism to receive payment other than in cash.
Moreover, the more merchants accept a credit card, the
more attractive a credit card is to consumers, and the more
consumers hold a credit card, the more willing merchants
are to accept the card and its related interconnection fee.66
Other “non-digital” multisided business models with
network effects include newspapers, traditional broadcast
television, video game consoles, financial exchanges, and
even farmer’s markets (which charge rent to sellers, and
allow shoppers to enter the market for free).
Of course a farmer’s market has network effects because
it is more valuable to buyers and sellers respectively to
the extent that there are more farmers and more local
shoppers participating. However, the magnitude of the
network effect is much greater, and potentially more salient
for tax purposes, when the “platform” (the marketplace)
involved can intermediate transactions globally. That
issue of magnitude is presumably what HMT and the
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European Commission think is special—network effects
and multisided business models combined with so-called
“cross-jurisdictional scale without mass.”
Focusing on the issue of large network effects combined
with cross-jurisdictional scale without mass brings us to
financial exchanges. Network effects are the key feature of
successful financial market making, because for transactions to take place there must be both buyers and sellers.
Specifically, market liquidity is an important feature
in determining transaction costs and making a market
attractive to participants, and the number of participants
is what determines liquidity. As the number of buyers and
sellers on a given exchange increase, liquidity increases, and
costs fall. Without enough buyers and sellers, the market
literally falls apart.
As an example, consider the Lloyd’s insurance marketplace, based in the UK. The vast majority of Lloyd’s
business involves insuring non-UK risks, often without
any physical presence in the jurisdictions where the
covered risk exists on behalf of either Lloyd’s or the
underwriters and syndicates that form the Lloyd’s marketplace.67 Moreover, the vast majority of the capital
in the Lloyd’s market does not come from the UK.68
But, as Lloyd’s itself explains, the certainty provided
by the marketplace as well as the network effects from
Lloyd’s global network of insurance companies, brokers,
and coverholders “makes Lloyd’s the world’s leading
(re)insurance platform.”69 The London stock exchange
is another important financial marketplace, albeit one
where at least some of the offerings are not as bespoke
(and therefore require less data) than is customary at
Lloyd’s.
Do users somehow participate less “actively” in traditional financial marketplaces when they enter into transactions than they do in online sharing marketplaces? The key
participation feature of online marketplaces are reviews
and ratings of sellers and buyers.
Much more complex user data is shared among the
specialist syndicates, brokers, and coverholders participating in the Lloyd’s insurance market than is shared by
short-term renters on a vacation rentals platform.70 And
these market participants interact in more complicated
ways than do renters and owners. Moreover, Lloyd’s has
now created a mandate that syndicates enter into many
of their contracts electronically over a digital platform.71
So, using Lloyd’s as an example, it becomes difficult to
see the clear distinction between an insurance intermediation platform and, for instance, the accommodation
intermediation platform represented by Airbnb. It is true
that historically one business (reinsurance) was globalized
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before the advent of the Internet while the other (home
rentals) was not. And historically underwriters sometimes
exchanged views offline, while renters often found it hard
to exchange views at all. However, now both businesses
are globalized, users on both the buy side and the sell side
share their views with one another in both industries, and
one industry is fully digitalized while the other is working
to move in that direction. It seems intellectually unsustainable to claim there is a relevant difference with respect to
user participation between the accommodation traded
on Airbnb and bespoke products traded electronically in
financial markets.
The Internet of Things (“IoT”) is likely to make the
distinction between businesses with network effects and
multisided business models and more “traditional” business even harder to maintain. IoT refers to the network
of physical objects embedded with sensors and network
connectivity that allows the collection and exchange of
data. Such sensors are becoming ubiquitous in the devices
we encounter in our daily environment. A large number of
IoT applications are being developed in various domains
by start-ups, SMEs, and large MNCs alike.72
One widely discussed IoT example is the idea of the
“connected car.” Connected cars are likely to feature seats
that face a windshield that is akin to a computer screen.73
Trends in automotive research and development involve
navigation and entertainment display screens built into
the dashboard to offer Internet-based information and
media, as well as sensors intended to pick up information
from roads and other networked cars. On one model of
what constitutes “active user participation,” a connected
car would have all the components for user participation
in place. The user would provide geo proximity data by
driving, financial information by leasing, and be in a car
that acts as a channel to deliver advertising to a “captive”
recipient.
On another model, use of a connected car would not
constitute “active user participation” because the user of
a connected car would not be actively writing a message
or rating a product or service. In that case, however, clicks
on a social media platform would also seem to constitute
“passive” user participation. It seems inconceivable that
“going” to a website or “searching” virtually should be
classified as active user participation but going somewhere
physically should be classified as passive activity.
Some projections suggest that there will be more than
30 billion IoT devices in use by 2020.74 In addition to
connected cars, commercial and industrial applications,
driven largely by building automation, industrial automation, and lighting, are projected to account for many of
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the new connected devices coming into use between 2018
and 2030.75 If those projections come to pass, it is hard to
imagine that user participation in historically non-digital
sectors will not exceed any de minimis user participation
threshold.
In sum, it does not seem intellectually defensible to
suggest that users only meaningfully contribute to value
creation in the context of certain digital platforms, or to
think that the boundaries of the idea are clear enough to
allow for anything approaching reasonable implementation. Indeed, as articulated thus far it is difficult to view
the proposal as anything other than either a) ill-conceived
or b) transparently instrumentalist and mercantilist.
But understanding the user participation perspective
remains important. For one thing, the user participation proposal highlights the political angle much of
Europe brings to the current digital tax debate. Even
more importantly, HMT and the Commission have both
suggested that when “active user participation” is present, “jurisdictions in which users are located should be
entitled to tax a portion of those businesses’ profits.”76
HMT wishes to achieve this result using what is in
effect a formulary system.77 The Commission proposes
doing so based on a facts and circumstances arm’s-length
analysis of the value of user participation.78 Either way,
these proposals seek to allocate some (although not
all) of the excess return of a business to the destination
jurisdiction. And that issue—destination-based income
taxation—lies at the heart of the intellectual debate
about the future of the corporate income tax as applied
cross-border.
Indeed, the core of Part III is a discussion of a proposal for allocating excess returns through a reform of
the international tax system that would create a hybrid
between a destination-based income tax and the present
residence-based system. Such a system would, like the
user participation proposals, allocate a part of the excess
return of a business to market (“user”) jurisdictions. Thus,
the second key question regarding a user participation
proposal, namely, how, across the whole of the economy,
one would determine to what degree users contribute to
“value creation,” is conceptually parallel to the question of
how, across the whole of the economy, one would allocate
a part of the excess return to market jurisdictions. That
is the “bridge” between the user participation proposal
and the “marketing intangibles” or “DBRMPA” proposal
described in Part III. Importantly, this means that all of the
technical and administrative issues that will be described
in Part IIIB below also apply in equal measure to any user
participation proposal.
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The principled issue is whether, how, and to what degree,
across the whole of the economy, law should allocate
the excess return of a business to consumer/user/market
jurisdictions for corporate income tax purposes. The key
difference between the proposal described in Part III and
the user participation theory is that the proposal in Part
III does not attempt to ring-fence the digital economy.
Rather, it tackles this allocation question generally, without
resorting to unsustainable and unjustifiable distinctions
in business models.

III. Where We Go from Here: DestinationBased Income Tax Reform?

This Part considers the “marketing intangibles” or
DBRMPA idea that constitutes a compromise between
the current transfer pricing system and a destination-basis
income tax. This hybrid approach may be under consideration in some form or other at the OECD. My formulation of this approach may or may not be the same as what
is under discussion at the OECD, as the proposal has not
been publicly described in any detail. However, no matter
how a marketing intangibles concept is formulated, certain
key issues will have to be addressed. These include how
to split excess returns between the current arm’s-length
system and an allocation to market countries, and how to
determine destination so as to split the amount allocated
to market countries among such countries.
The DBRMPA described here is a compromise between
the present transfer pricing system and a form of destination-based income tax known as a destination-based residual
profit allocation (“DBRPA”). The DBRMPA proposal
divides intangible returns between those generated by
so-called “customer-based” or marketing intangibles and
those generated by other (presumably usually “productionbased”) intangibles. Residual returns deemed attributable to
customer-based or marketing intangibles would be allocated
to the market—the jurisdictions where the customers reside.
Residual returns deemed attributable to other intangibles
would be allocated based on current transfer pricing rules
(i.e., the BLTV). Importantly, in this sense the DBRMPA
functions in the same way as user participation, but does
so across the whole economy, instead of ring-fencing this
change based on a cliff effect determined by whether a business is categorized as being “digitalized” or not.

A. Background: The Destination-Based
Residual Profit Allocation

The DBRPA proposal was developed by a group consisting of Alan Auerbach, Michael Devereaux, Michael
Keen, Paul Oosterhuis, Wolfgang Schön, and John Vella.
The idea is explained in the excellent paper authored by
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Joe Andrus and Paul Oosterhuis for this conference in
2016 entitled “Transfer Pricing After BEPS: Where Are We
and Where Should We Be Going.” Further details appear
in a presentation given by Paul Oosterhuis at Oxford
University in 2016.79 The proposal represents an attempt
to move toward a destination-basis corporate income tax
system by means that can at least be described as remaining consistent with some of the principles of the current
“arm’s-length” transfer pricing architecture.
The DBRMPA is fundamentally a compromise between
a DBRPA and the current transfer pricing system. Thus,
analyzing the DBRMPA first and foremost requires understanding the DBRPA.80
The DBRPA proposal is animated by the understanding that the location of consumers is less mobile than the
location of booked profits, intellectual property, corporate assets, corporate employees, or any other element
of value creation. In this sense it is similar to sales-based
FA. However, the DBRPA attempts to separate “excess”
or “residual” returns from “routine returns,” and provide
a normal rate of return to productive functions. The firstorder advantages of a DBRPA are supposed to be reduced
incentives to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions, reduced
complexity and reduced administrative burdens.
The core idea is to salvage the existing arm’s-length
system with respect to routine returns, while using a
sales-based system to allocate residual returns. How would
it work? To allocate excess/residual returns, the DBRPA
deems the country in which customer sales take place
to be an “entrepreneurial” affiliate with respect to local
market sales, and ascribes all “non-routine” profits to that
affiliate.81 Achieving this result would require MNCs to
measure gross revenues by country and by product using
some concept of “destination” or “place of supply.” Global
costs would need to be measured at a product line level,
and then either traced or apportioned out to revenues
from specific countries.
The DBRPA mechanism for allocating the residual share
to the market is quite similar to a cost-sharing approach
for allocating income attributed to intangibles. However,
instead of allocating the residual profit to an “entrepreneurial risk-taker” in an MNC group defined as the affiliate that
owns the intangible property and takes on financial risk (as
in contemporary cost-sharing models), the residual profit
is instead allocated to affiliates in the respective market
jurisdictions. The proposal in effect imposes deemed contractual arrangements to which traditional transfer pricing
methods are then applied. As a result, the DBRPA allocates
excess returns on a product line by product line basis rather
than an entity by entity basis. In doing so it appropriately
escapes the “formulary apportionment” label.
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1. Comparison of DBRPA with Sales-Based FA. The
most important difference between a DBRPA and salesbased FA is that a DBRPA would modify transfer pricing
methodologies so as to allocate only “excess” or “residual”
profits to the jurisdiction of sale.82 Sales-based FA systems
do not necessarily allocate any income to jurisdictions
where corporate functions take place. In the United States,
our status as a very large market obscures this concern that
sales-based FA raises. But consider a small jurisdiction;
let’s call it Denmark. Whatever the theoretical merits,
it is probably hard for politicians to explain to Danish
taxpayers that a Danish corporation which exploits a
range of local benefits to make outputs that are wholly or
almost wholly exported will pay no or almost no corporate
income tax in Denmark. The cost-plus markup on productive functions in the DBRPA is somewhat responsive to
the concern that sales-based FA provides no revenue to
jurisdictions where economic activity takes place. It solves
the “Denmark problem” to some degree.
Although DBRPA is not a sales-based FA proposal, in
many circumstances DBRPA could produce results that
are similar to the residual sales-based formulary apportionment (“RFA”) proposal put forth by Avi-Yonah, Clausing
and Durst in 2011. RFA would allocate a fixed markup
(7.5% in the Durst et al proposal) on costs to entities that
undertake activity within an MNC.83 All other profits
would then be allocated to the destination/market country.
The key difference between DBRPA and RFA is that
DBRPA imposes a destination-basis allocation for residual
returns on a product line by product line and individualized country by country basis.84 If percentage of gross
sales revenue on the one hand and percentage of corporate
profit on the other vary significantly by country, DBRPA
and RFA would generate different results.85 Similarly, if
average profit levels vary by product line and some countries generate more revenue for an MNE from high-profit
products while other countries generate more revenue for
an MNE from low-profit products, DBRPA and RFA
would generate different results.86
DBRPA requires determining where sales occur. Andrus
and Oosterhuis correctly observe that using location of
sales to allocate income “raises several particularly difficult issues,81 including: the treatment of remote sales, the
treatment of sales through intermediaries, the treatment
of sales of raw materials, components and intermediate
goods, the treatment of capital goods sales and the treatment of services.”87 At minimum, addressing these issues
would require augmented information exchange and
potentially some degree of collection assistance. These
issues also have first-order ramifications for DBRMPA,
and so are addressed further below. Another important
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issue discussed below is that, like both sales-based FA and
RFA, DBRPA likely requires countries to agree on rules
that define the corporate income tax base.
Other technical questions also arise in thinking about
DBRPA.88 Such issues include the treatment of losses,
the treatment of flow-through entities, the treatment
of certain financial transactions, and the treatment of
M&A. In addition, financial accounting treatment may be
problematic, and there are important questions about the
compatibility of these ideas with tax treaties and international trade commitments. These issues were outlined in
the 2016 Andrus and Oosterhuis effort. I do not rehash
that discussion below, although these concerns may be
relevant to a DBRMPA as well.

B. Destination-Based Residual Marketing
Profit Allocation

A DBRMPA has the same starting point as a DBRPA:
affiliates of an MNE are compensated for their functions
on a cost plus or return on assets basis using arm’s-length
principles. Unlike in the DBRPA, however, the “residual
return” must then be divided between marketing or customer-based intangibles and other intangibles. This division is necessary in order to then allocate income deemed
to arise from customer-based or marketing intangibles to
the market of destination for the good or service, while
allocating the remaining residual return under existing
transfer pricing principles.
Going forward in this Part I will use the term “marketing intangibles.” There may very well be a substantive
distinction between marketing intangibles and customerbased intangibles. For example, in the U.S. core deposits
of a financial institution were historically thought of as a
“customer-based” intangible, but might not be a marketing intangible. Similarly, the value of a “network effect”
might be considered a “customer-based” intangible but
not a marketing intangible.89 However, in this discussion
I explicitly do not intend to invoke such substantive distinctions. I am simply choosing a single term (marketing
intangibles) for ease of exposition.90
The conceptual motivation for the DBRMPA derives
from at least two sources. First, some believe certain
export-driven jurisdictions would adamantly reject a
DBRPA. However, at least two of the most prominent
of these jurisdictions, Germany and Japan, may believe
that the intangible value held by their domestically-
headquartered corporations derives primarily from
production intangibles rather than from marketing
intangibles. Thus, these jurisdictions (the theory presumably goes) might be willing to accept a DBRMPA.
Second, some policymakers may believe that marketing
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intangibles are fundamentally “customer-based,” and
therefore more appropriately allocated to jurisdictions of
destination (“the market”) than is income attributable to
other intangibles.
Both of these premises are subject to doubt. For purposes
of this paper, however, I will set those two questions aside
and limit myself to administrative and pragmatic issues
associated with the DBRMPA. This drafting decision
is not because I’m persuaded by the premises described
above.
The DBRMPA raises three basic administrative concerns. First, it retains all of the problems of current transfer
pricing law, because with respect to residual returns that
are not allocated to the marketing intangibles current law
applies. Second, the proposal imposes an inadministrable
distinction between residual returns associated with marketing intangibles and other residual returns. Third, since
a DBRMPA allocates residual returns associated with
marketing intangibles to the market jurisdiction, all the
challenges associated with any destination-basis income
tax proposal are present in the DBRMPA.
The problems of current transfer pricing law are wellknown, and were also discussed in Part IA. Part IIIB.1
discusses historical evidence suggesting that the distinction between marketing intangibles and other intangibles
is not administrable, and also considers various potential
solutions to that concern. Part IIIB.2 discusses the difficulties associated with determining destination for
purposes of allocating revenues in a destination-basis
income tax. There are two sub-issues. First, mechanisms
used in the VAT to determine destination do not work in
an income tax. Second, solutions to determine destination
by building on existing income tax-based concepts are
insufficiently robust. Part IIIB.3 describes the difficulties
that arise because the DBRMPA relies on unitary tax
principles for purposes of allocating costs, but not for
purposes of determining revenues. Part IIIB.4 concludes
that the DBRMPA, while it seems attractive as a political
compromise at 100,000 feet, entails a level of complexity
and embedded sources for further conflict as between
sovereigns and as between sovereigns and multinationals
that is problematic. It also would require a significant
degree of international tax harmonization.
1. Dividing a Residual Return Between MarketingBased and Other Intangibles. The DBRMPA raises
an important and likely technically irresolvable point
of controversy: the extent to which residual returns are
attributable to customer-based or other intangible assets.
A legislative definition of “marketing” or “customerbased” intangibles would presumably be required to
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operationalize a basic DBRMPA proposal. One could
certainly imagine such definitions. For example, a statute
might define income associated with patents, copyrights,
trade secrets, and any other intangible clearly related to
product function or composition as “production-based”
intangible income, and specify that all other income not
allocated to a routine return was “marketing intangible”
income. Alternatively, a statute could define marketing intangibles to include trademarks, tradenames, and
franchises as well as the value of installed customer bases,
expectation of future business from that base, and goodwill
and going concern value.
A working legislative definition does not solve the
underlying valuation problem. Conceptually the
DBRMPA requires valuation of all “marketing intangibles”
as distinct from all other intangibles in order to produce
a ratio via which all residual income could be divided
between marketing intangible income (which in this usage
can equivalently be called “customer-based intangible
income”) and other intangible income.
This issue—distinguishing between customer-based
intangibles and other intangibles—is not new for U.S. law.
Prior to enactment of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993, many categories of intangibles were eligible
for income forecast depreciation, often on accelerated
schedules.91 As a result the value of customer-based
intangibles as opposed to patents and other intangibles
acquired in various transactions had to be determined.
Amortization deductions before 1993 depended on the
acquirer’s ability to establish that an acquired intangible
had a limited useful life that could be established with
reasonable accuracy and an ascertainable value separate
from goodwill, since goodwill was non-amortizable.92
Amortizable intangibles were then amortized under various useful lives.
In contrast, Code Sec. 197 spreads amortization over a
15-year straight line period, without regard to their “type.”
Code Sec. 197 obviates the need to ascertain individual
valuations for different categories of intangibles, and
greatly diminishes the incentive taxpayers once had to
characterize acquired intangibles as assets distinguishable
from goodwill and going concern value.
Fred Goldberg, a former Commissioner of the IRS,
explained the administrative problem created by prior
law to Congress in 1992, shortly after he left the job
of Commissioner of the IRS and became the Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy. He testified that
the need to allocate basis among purchased intangibles
not only resulted in substantial uncertainty and dissimilar treatment of similarly situated taxpayers, but also
imposed large wasteful transaction and administrative
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costs on taxpayers and the government. Before 1993,
disputes over the amortization of customer-based or
market-based intangibles, including but not limited to
items such as core deposits held by financial institutions,
insurance expirations, and newspaper and magazine subscription lists, produced many prominent, large dollar
litigations.93 As one author described the problem, “the
governance of purchase price allocations to intangible
assets [has become] an administrative quagmire and a
judicial disaster.”94
For tax years between 1979 and 1987, for all unresolved audit cases (on any issue) in examination, appeals,
or litigation as of mid-1989, in fully 70% of those cases
in which taxpayers claimed that an intangible assets had
a determinable useful life over which amortization was
available, the IRS proposed adjustments and claimed that
the assets were in fact goodwill.95 Moreover, for that same
period, the single category of intangible assets over which
this dispute arose most often were customer or marketbased intangibles.96 The debate before 1993 regarding
acquired intangibles largely focused on distinguishing
between customer-based intangibles and goodwill, the
latter of which was not amortizable under pre-1993 law.
But the core problem was allocating purchase price premia
across intangible asset categories generally.
This same issue—whether an intangible is a customer or
market-based intangible or some other intangible (goodwill or something else) would arise in a new guise in a
regime that distinguishes between “marketing intangibles”
and other intangibles. As long as one result is more favorable for the taxpayer on the one hand or the government
on the other, or for one government or another, incentives
for controversies regarding classification arise. But relative
to pre-1993 U.S. law, the difference would be that instead
of being limited to cases where intangibles were acquired,
the controversy would arise with respect to every single
cross-border transaction in which a non-routine return
existed. The intangible classification incentive of a foreign
sovereign where any DEMPE functions took place and the
incentives of the IRS would always be at cross-purposes. To
paraphrase Fred Goldberg’s 1992 congressional testimony
regarding the analogous issue a generation ago, if we go
down this path, “[n]o amount of after the fact enforcement and litigation can possibly remedy the situation.”97
We will have re-created a mess from a generation ago and
compounded it exponentially.
a. A “Two-Sided” Valuation Solution? Another key difficulty with a DBRMPA arises from the fact that, like the
DBRPA, this is a transactional method. The DPRMPA
therefore has the complexity associated with determining
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profit levels on a product line by product line and countryby-country basis.
However, the DBRMPA differs from the DBRPA in
that it requires a profit split of the residual profit being
allocated for each transaction between profits attributed to
marketing intangibles and other residual profits. A methodology must be chosen to undertake this profit split.98
In transfer pricing terms, on first impression a DBRMPA
would seem to require application of the transactional
profit split method to all transactions, even where only
one party makes unique and valuable contributions.
We’ve spent years in transfer pricing trying to limit the
use of the transactional profit split method. The OECD’s
recent guidance on the application of the transactional
profit split explains why: “[a] weakness of the transactional
profit split method relates to difficulties in its application.”99 As a result, the OECD perspective is that “where
the accurate delineation of the transaction determines
that one party to the transaction performs only simple
functions, does not assume economically significant risks
in relation to the transaction and does not otherwise
make any contribution which is unique and valuable, a
transactional profit split method typically would not be
appropriate.”100 For the same reason, the OECD maintains
that “a lack of comparables alone is insufficient to warrant
the use of a transactional profit split.”101
In various high-profile cases over the years, the application of the transactional profit split produced highly
intractable disputes between taxpayers and governments
and between competent authorities in governments. One
well-remembered example is the IRS transfer pricing dispute with Glaxo SmithKline Holdings (Americas) Inc. &
Subsidiaries (“GSK”) for the tax years 1989–2005.102 The
essence of the dispute was over the level of U.S. profits
reported by GSK after making intercompany payments
that needed to take into account production intangibles
developed by and trademarks owned by its UK parent,
relative to the value of GSK’s marketing intangibles in
the United States.103
The facts of the GSK case required coordination between
the United States and the UK with respect to what current
OECD TPG would describe as a two-sided transactional
profit split. The public record suggests the UK government
never acceded to the U.S. assertion as to the share of the
GSK profits that were attributable to U.S. marketing
intangibles rather than UK production intangibles.104 The
GSK case is particularly well-remembered, and the size of
the dispute was unusual, but the basic setup is not unique.
Two-sided transactional profit splits lend themselves to
requiring intergovernmental coordination through MAP
to avoid double juridical taxation. Even after the BEPS
101

ERA OF DIGITAL DISRUPTION

project and the advent of the multilateral instrument,
mandatory binding arbitration is still available only in a
limited set of MAP cases, and the risk of failures of MAP
coordination remains high in transactional profit splits.
Sometimes, maybe this is just the way it has to be. But
why would we want to adopt an international tax system
that sets up this exact type of dispute between taxpayers
and governments and as between national tax administrations in every case; including in the broad swath of cases
where everyone previously agreed the transactional profit
split method had no relevance?105
b. A Relative “Capitalized Expenditure” Approach?
Another potential approach to splitting residual profit
between profits being allocated to marketing intangibles
and profits being allocated to other intangibles could involve
specifying which expenditures contribute to developing
marketing intangibles and which expenditures contribute to
developing other intangibles. Governments would then presumably establish “useful lives” for various buckets of expenditure. The resulting relative “capitalized values” associated
with marketing intangibles as compared to other intangibles
would produce a ratio. The ratio would change each year
as a result of both new expenditures by the MNC and the
operation of whatever “amortization schedule” was adopted
for the various buckets of expenditure. The “amortization
schedule” would not produce actual deductions; it would
simply establish the annual ratio of “marketing intangibles”
to “other intangibles.” That ratio (as it adjusted each year,
presumably on a product line by product line basis), would
provide the ratio of excess return to be allocated through the
current arm’s-length system as opposed to being assigned to
market jurisdictions for each specified product line.
Something akin to this approach is said to have been
used in some advanced pricing agreements entered into
by some multinationals both with the IRS and with foreign tax administrations. But generalizing this approach
would be very resource intensive. Moreover, the approach
transmutes the debate as to what constitutes a “marketing”
or “customer-based” intangible as opposed to other intangibles into a debate as to what costs develop a “marketing
intangible” and what costs develop other intangibles (e.g.,
production intangibles) and what the respective useful
lives of such expenditures should be.106 It is unclear to
me that this represents a meaningful improvement on
the basic two-sided DBRMPA method described in Part
IIIB.1.a. It certainly highlights the relationship between
the problem of relative valuation in a DBRMPA and the
useful life issues Code Sec. 197 was enacted to eliminate.
Finally, the relative capitalized expenditure approach is
hard to translate into the context of the digital business
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models that are at the heart of this debate. Which expenditures can be attributed to creating “network effects,”
and thereby a form of “marketing intangible?” Considered
prima facie as an intellectual matter, arguably few or none.
But is that an answer that would be globally accepted?
c. A “One-Sided” Valuation Solution? The central
problem described in Parts IIIB.1.a and IIIB.1.b arises
as a result of the attempt to put relative values on the
intangibles associated with “marketing intangibles” as
compared to other intangibles. Again, in IIIB.1.a valuing
“marketing intangibles” and “other intangibles” respectively is just a mechanism to create the ratio of excess
return to be allocated through the current arm’s-length
system as opposed to being assigned to market jurisdictions. IIIB.1.b, produces the same ratio through a relative
“capitalized asset” approach.
Another alternative to resolve the relative valuation
marketing intangible/other intangible allocation problem would be to value the excess return that should be
ascribed to specifically listed production intangibles. The
system could then allocate the residual—that is to say,
the excess return remaining after subtracting the return
given to non-routine production intangibles—to the
“marketing bucket” and assign it to market jurisdictions
on a destination-basis.
This one-sided DBRMPA method would avoid the
problem described in Parts IIIB.1.a and IIIB.1.b with
respect to dividing residual returns between marketing
intangibles (the market) and other intangibles (the current
transfer pricing system) using a ratio. Instead, one could
imagine using a one-sided method by attempting to locate
a comparable uncontrolled transaction for non-routine
production intangibles,107 or by applying a profit indicator, for example a return on costs associated with specified
production intangibles (or some other net profit indicator).
This latter approach (a one-sided profit indicator
approach) is similar to the OECD’s “transactional net
margin method” (“TNMM”) (known in the United States
as a comparable profits method), but with one important
difference. The OECD TPG specify that a TNMM is only
supposed to be applied when one of the two parties owns
and controls all the relevant non-routine intangibles.
MNCs would be incentivized to adapt tax planning
to a one-sided DBRMPA, which would value the return
to “marketing intangibles” as a residual after a return
is ascribed to non-routine production intangibles. In a
one-sided DBRMPA world with DEMPE rules (i.e., the
BLTV) for the allocation of the return ascribed to production intangibles, MNCs would seek to a) locate their
production intangibles in low-tax jurisdictions and b)
MARCH 2019

maximize the valuations for their production intangibles.
Nevertheless, because excess returns are so large for the
world’s leading companies, the one-sided methodology
DBRMPA, which ascribes a specified return to production
intangibles and gives everything else to the market, would
likely allocate most (high) excess returns to the market/
marketing intangibles.
A one-sided DBRMPA methodology that values only
specified production intangibles is intellectually distinguishable from a DBRPA. However, as a practical matter
the one-sided DBRMPA produces a result that asymptotically approaches the outcome in a DBRPA. It also has
all the issues associated with determining destination in
DBRPA, without achieving one of the DBRPA’s virtues,
which is eliminating the administrative problems associated with current transfer pricing law.
It should also be noted that the reason the DBRPA is
not currently under consideration internationally does not
appear to be related to whether it is normatively defensible.
Rather, the DBRPA is not part of the debate because it is
politically unpalatable to a number of major jurisdictions
and other constituencies that oppose allocating all or most
of the residual return from intangible assets to market
jurisdictions. The one-sided DBRMPA methodology
could be politically unpalatable to those same jurisdictions
and other constituencies.
Finally, one should note that the one-sided DBRMPA
methodology described above is in some sense the inverse
of the “digital investment” idea put forth by Wolfgang
Schön.108 Schön’s idea treats “digital investment” as the
functional equivalent of the “marketing intangible” in
the DBRMPA. Schön suggests that market-specific digital
investment should be measured, and the return associated
with that investment should be valued using a TNMMtype approach and allocated to market jurisdictions. How
that measurement would be accomplished is not entirely
clear, but Schön’s idea is quite interesting. It could be integrated into the current transfer pricing system more easily
than any DBRMPA concept. And the digital investment
concept certainly would not asymptotically approach a
DBRPA. It is unclear whether the Schön’s proposal is being
considered as a mechanism to implement the marketing
intangibles idea. However, the terminology used by Schön
and the terminology that has been used publicly to date
in the marketing intangibles discussion do not overlap.
d. A “Formulary DBRMPA” Solution? Some might
acknowledge the problems of allocating between production intangibles and marketing intangibles based on either
a “two-sided” or a “one-sided” transfer pricing method,
and then suggest that the issue should simply be resolved
MARCH 2019

by agreeing a percentage allocation to the market. For
instance, governments could agree that distinguishing
between market intangibles and other intangibles was
not systematically administrable, and therefore the excess
return should just be divided based on fixed percentages
(50/50) between market jurisdictions and the existing
arm’s-length standard (the BLTV). A formulary approach
clearly does address the allocation problems described
above with respect to the DBRMPA as between marketing intangibles and other intangibles. Moreover, it does so
without asymptotically approaching a DBRPA.
However, formulary DBRMPA likely raises the issues
traditional FA raised in the United States. In other words,
because activity is mobile, but sales are not, jurisdictions
would be incentivized to abandon a 50/50 split and move
in the direction of a 100% allocation to destination.
U.S. states use an FA system to determine their taxable
share of U.S.-source corporate profits. The basic mechanics of an FA system, in which intercompany transactions
are generally ignored, are thus familiar to most U.S. tax
lawyers. A generation ago U.S. state corporate tax apportionment formulas were based on a weighted average of the
shares of sales, payroll, and assets in the state.109 However,
these formulas create an implicit excise tax on the factors
used in the formula.110 As a result, the three-factor formula
discourages MNCs from investing in assets or generating
employment in high-tax locations.
Over the years the states of the United States shifted (in
inconsistent ways) away from three-factor apportionment
toward sales-only apportionment factors to gain a competitive advantage in attracting tangible investment and
jobs.111 In the international setting, with higher tax rates
than state income taxes and fewer coordination mechanisms to limit competition, most serious commentators
agree that this dynamic would be more intense. Moreover,
customers are much less mobile than employment in the
cross-border setting, so economic theory would suggest
that a sales-based apportionment should produce fewer
economic distortions than an apportionment formula that
took location of employment into account.112
Formulary DBRMPA would crystallize the problems of
the BLTV. Research consistently shows that high skilled—
DEMPE-capable—labor is the most mobile form of labor
globally (certainly more mobile than the payroll and assets
factors of traditional FA). Meanwhile consumers are quite
immobile. The dichotomy between an apportionment
factor that is immobile and an apportionment factor that
is highly mobile, with fixed percentages to each, creates
an implicit excise tax on the mobile factor. That reality
would likely push countries in the direction of unilaterally choosing a 100% allocation to the immobile factor
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(the location of the consumer), in order to eliminate the
implicit excise tax on high-skilled jobs that the 50/50 split
would create, just as U.S. states over-weighted sales and
abandoned the payroll factor to encourage job creation in
their jurisdictions. Moreover, in the international system,
even more than at the level of the U.S. states, it is not
clear what enforcement mechanisms exist to ensure that
countries abide by an agreed 50/50 split. Bilateral tax treaties are not well-suited to enshrining such an approach.
The one potential solution I see to the pressures created by the formulary DBRMPA’s implicit excise tax on
DEMPE jobs in higher-tax jurisdictions is to abandon the
BLTV. Governments could decide to revert to pre-BEPS
TPG for the part of the excess return attributed to other
intangibles and allocated under transfer pricing rules. In
that world, contractual allocations of risk would be more
fully respected and income shifting for the “other intangibles” portion of excess returns would be somewhat easier
than under current law. But shifting income would not
require shifting well-paying (and highly mobile) jobs out
of higher tax jurisdictions. Reverting to the pre-BEPS TPG
therefore would reduce the otherwise inevitable pressure for
countries to unilaterally move from a DBRMPA to a 100%
allocation of the excess return to the market jurisdiction.

where to book sales. Andrus and Oosterhuis, as well as
other commentators, in effect suggest that concepts for
determining destination that have evolved outside the
United States for purposes of implementing the valueadded tax might be modified for purposes of administering
a DBRMPA.114 The VAT does effectively establish destination by means of proxies and administrative solutions in
the consumption tax context in most cases. The difficulty is
that the mechanisms the VAT uses for this purpose simply
are not amenable to implementation in an income tax.115

2. Problems with Relying on Destination for Income Tax
Purposes. In any system that allocates part of the return to
the market (in other words, any “destination-basis” system)
the tax burden is meant to rest in the jurisdiction of the
final consumer, rather than the jurisdiction of residence
of any intermediaries in the supply chain. The economic
rationale for this result is that the final consumer is thought
to be the least mobile factor. Thus, from a theoretical
economics perspective, a destination-basis system is less
economically distortive than other more mobile bases for
assessing corporate tax.113
However, if the administrative mechanism for measuring the location of sales does not conform to the location of
the final consumer, this justification for attempting to tax
at destination is undermined. Importantly, multinationals
can easily structure their transfer pricing arrangements to
book sales income in a jurisdiction that is not the jurisdiction of residence of the final consumer and are incentivized
to do so if they can lower their tax burden as a result.
The U.S. international income tax system has been cognizant of this category of issue for decades; it is at the heart
of both the 20th century understanding of Code Sec. 482
and the 1962 foreign base company sales income rules.
For the same reason, every destination-basis income tax
proposal relies on a concept of destination separate and
apart from the contractual decision MNCs make about

i. Destination of Goods. For tangible goods, VAT laws generally assess VAT using frontier or border controls.117 Imported
goods are in effect treated as having the destination of the
jurisdiction where they clear customs. VAT is assessed on
the full value of the good as it enters the jurisdiction. VAT
laws then free exports of VAT through a combination of
non-inclusion of proceeds and a refund mechanism for VAT
previously paid. As a result, the VAT avoids the difficulties a
destination-basis income tax would have with cross-border
sales through third-party intermediaries.
The reason third-party cross-border intermediation does
not obscure destination in the VAT is that the intermediary
pays a full tax on its purchases, and has the full amount
refunded on re-export. Exports are not included in the tax
base, and then a tax based on the sales price of the good
is collected at the jurisdiction of (further) destination.
A similar result applies with respect to importation of
intermediate inputs (whether raw materials, components,
or intermediate goods) that are subsequently exported as
part of a different tangible good, and (thanks to expensing)
even with respect to capital goods that are purchased to
allow for the manufacture of other products for export.118
In all cases the credit-input system thereby moves the tax
burden to the final buyer.
This VAT system for ensuring that tax is collected at
destination only works because the system taxes on a
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a. Inapplicability of VAT Best Practices. The VAT generally resolves the issue of determining destination using
the credit-invoice mechanism. Two of the most important
features of the credit-invoice mechanism are taxation on
gross amounts and imposition of tax on every transfer,
both intra-firm and inter-firm.
An income tax cannot adopt the credit-invoice mechanism for one key reason: income taxes tax net income,
rather than gross revenues. In an income tax cross-border
business input purchases are generally deductible. In
contrast, the VAT establishes destination in large measure by providing cross-border business input purchases
a treatment that is the equivalent of non-deductibility.116
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gross basis and refunds on every intra-firm and inter-firm
transfer. An income tax cannot adopt this basic element of
the credit-invoice mechanism as it operates in cross-border
situations and remains a tax on net income. As a result,
the VAT does not provide useful guidance for resolving
problems of destination of goods in an income tax system.
ii. Location of Services. Determining the destination of
cross-border trade in services and intangibles more generally has been a key issue in reforming the VAT for the 21st
century.119 Since there are no customs controls to impose
the VAT at the point of importation on services and intangibles, creating administrable proxies for the destination
principle in services and intangibles is challenging. The
OECD has developed special guidelines for determining
the jurisdiction of taxation for international supplies of
services and intangibles over the last decade that attempt
to reflect the destination principle.
Determining the location of services raises especially difficult issues in the MNC context.120 In many cases, MNC
service recipients utilize the services of a service provider
in multiple jurisdictions. The country that the services
are billed to can become a mechanism for manipulation
in a DBRMPA.
Charge-out mechanisms of the kind used in today’s
income tax system can and do conceptually resolve the
problem of determining the destination of services an
MNC recipient receives and uses in multiple locations in
the VAT context.121 However, the difficulty raised by this
solution for tax administrations in the DBRMPA context
is different and should not be trivialized. Tax administrations would need to audit service recipients to determine
whether charge-outs had been made appropriately in order
to inform their audit of the service provider. While charge
outs can be a subject of audit in today’s income tax system,
tax administrators never need to ask whether charge outs
by an unrelated party change the tax result for a separate,
unrelated taxpayer. The level of internal coordination such
a system would require of government auditors simply
does not exist today within tax administrations.
b. Known Solutions Building on Income Tax
Administrative Concepts Are Insufficiently Robust.
As noted above, sales through third-party distributors
would raise substantial avoidance and/or enforcement
issues for a DBRMPA. Since the administrative features
of the VAT cannot help, other anti-abuse rules would
be needed in a DBRMPA to address the tax incentive to
structure operations to have customers purchase products
through a third-party distributor in a low-tax jurisdiction.
Most likely some type of look-through rule would be
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required.122 However, making a look-through rule work
would require reporting by third party distributing purchasers. Andrus and Oosterhuis imagine implementation
of this sort of system in the context of single-factor sales
apportionment.123
Getting buy-sell arrangements with third-party distributors to be treated equivalently to related party distribution
arrangements or third-party agency distribution arrangements would be challenging. In theory, a DBRMPA
would also need similar look-through rules to allocate
revenue from sales of intermediate inputs to third-party
manufacturers. Ideally these sales would be allocated on
a look-through basis based on the country of sale of the
end good into which intermediate goods are ultimately
incorporated. However, because this structure is infeasible,
Andrus and Oosterhuis recommend treating the place
where the goods are incorporated into products of the
purchaser as the location of sale.124 The sale of capital goods
raises a more extreme version of the same problem—these
are in effect the sale of intermediary goods with a long
useful life the value of which is then embedded in end
consumer goods and services.
Andrus and Oosterhuis suggest that to prevent rampant abuse, we would need to distinguish between “real”
manufacturing and mere re-importation or packaging (this
would backstop the look-through rule for distributing
purchasers). As they wrote “[t]he location, for example,
of the final packaging or labeling of products can too easily be manipulated if a significant tax advantage results.”
They then suggest the contract manufacturing rules (which
distinguish manufacturing from repackaging) might be
used to address this concern.
Those familiar with the difficulties in administering
and unintended planning engendered by the contract
manufacturing rules might be concerned about adopting
a facts and circumstances test for all cross-border transactions, rather than the occasional instance of foreign base
company sales income. However, the primary problem
is a deeper one: in this case the jurisdiction in which a
tax administration would need to audit the question of
whether real manufacturing had occurred would often
be a jurisdiction in which the MNC under audit has no
physical presence. And, as with the location of service use
discussed in IIIB.2.a, tax administrations would again
be in the position of auditing one business to figure out
where taxing rights lie for the profits of an unrelated
corporation. Absent a radically improved and streamlined environment for both information exchange and
international tax administrative assistance, how are the
arising enforcement questions supposed to be addressed?
Licensing arrangements and franchising structures raise
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parallel but—from an audit perspective—perhaps more
complicated questions than those described above for
third-party intermediary sales.125
c. Other Methods of Identifying Destination. There
may be mechanisms outside historic VAT or income tax
practice to identify the destination of some goods and services. Two examples that come to mind are pharmaceutical
products and technology that has an IP address. In the
pharmaceutical industry for non-tax regulatory reasons
businesses generally must keep track of the destination
of their products even when those products are being
distributed by third-party distributors. An IP address
can be used as a proxy for location, so a DBRMPA could
potentially treat goods that have an IP address as having
the destination associated with their IP address.
The question that then arises is whether destination can
be determined using such non-tax proxies for most, some,
or only a low percentage of goods and services that generate
excess returns. The answer to this question is unclear. What
is certain is that the destination of all goods that generate
excess returns is not determinable based on piggybacking
on non-tax regulatory rules or relying on IP addresses.
d. Relationship Between FDII and Any DestinationBased Allocation System. Interestingly, the IRS and the
U.S. Treasury are likely to put all the above-discussed
concepts for determining destination to the test. New
section 250 of the Code (“FDII”) in effect establishes
a preferential tax rate for income derived by domestic
corporations from serving foreign markets. The statutory
rules require determining the foreign portion of deduction
eligible income. This amount includes income derived
from the sale of property to any foreign person for a foreign use. It also includes income derived in connection
with services provided to any person not located within
the United States, or with respect to property that is not
located in the United States. Thus, the destination of
both goods and services must be determined in order to
implement the new FDII rules of Code Sec. 250. The IRS
and the Treasury will need to write regulations describing how taxpayers should make these determinations in
the coming 12 months in order to implement the FDII
regime. Any multilateral organization or foreign sovereign
evaluating a proposal for a DBRMPA would therefore be
well-advised to evaluate the regulatory output of the IRS
and the Treasury in this regard.
3. Problems with Unitary Approach. As discussed earlier, a DBRMPA relies on the DBRPA with respect to
the portion of the excess return of the MNC allocated
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to marketing intangibles. The DBRPA in turn is not a
formulary system, because it measures returns at a product
line level and provides jurisdictions “credit” for higher
prices. However, escaping the formulary label does not
equate to escaping the related “unitary” label. The DBRPA
calculates most revenues at a country level, but it calculates
costs on a global consolidated basis, just like the “unitary”
aspect of FA.
An important downside of global consolidation is that
it requires a common measure of taxable income across
jurisdictions. In other words, one needs a single measurement of apportionable income. That is the “unitary” aspect
of FA. DBRMPA may not require a common measure of
gross income, but it would require common rules regarding costs. The most obvious category of costs that need
common allocation rules are indirect costs. The problems
of indirect cost allocation are familiar to U.S. practitioners
from the foreign tax credit system and our current debates
about the GILTI. A DBRMPA would need globally agreed
rules about analogous difficult issues.126
Moreover, for the DBRPA to work well, schedules for
depreciation or amortization of tangible and intangible
property, treatment of original issue discount—and perhaps even issues like the method used for inventorying
costs or the treatment of fines and penalties—would
ideally be standardized across jurisdictions. As Julie Roin
explained a decade ago with respect to FA, unitary systems
become inadministrable if global costs must be measured
for purposes of determining income in each jurisdiction,
but each jurisdiction has its own rules with respect to when
those global costs are taken into account.127
These issues with the “unitary” dimension of FA are
well-trodden ground. What observers may not appreciate
is that the DBRMPA does not avoid those issues. Indeed,
because the DBRMPA requires allocating indirect costs on
a product line basis rather than a QBU basis, the unitary
concerns that require tax harmonization to address may
be more extensive than under FA.
4. Conclusions re DBRMPA. The DBRMPA combines
many of the administrative problems of a residual apportionment system and an arm’s-length system in an attempt
to produce a political compromise. That political compromise allocates part but only part of the residual return to
market jurisdictions. Replacing the current international
tax rules with this system would entail substantial institutional transition costs in the United States and elsewhere.128
Adopting a system that combines the issues of a residual
apportionment system based on destination with the issues
of an arm’s-length system reduces the stakes associated with
the challenges of each part of the new combined system if
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and only if the relative share of the excess return allocated
to each part of the new combined system is clear. In this
regard, a relative valuation-based DBRMPA recreates the
administrative quagmire we had in the United States for
valuing acquired intangibles prior to 1993, and expands
it to every cross-border transaction involving an intangible.129 In contrast, a “formulary DBRMPA” would
resolve this issue by agreeing an arbitrary percentage split
of excess returns so as to allocate a set percentage of the
excess to market jurisdictions and the remainder to the
current arm’s-length standard. However, the formulary
DBRMPA may be subject to the same dynamic that manifested itself in connection with traditional three-factor
FA in the United States. In other words, jurisdictions are
likely to have economic incentives, revenue incentives, or
both to abandon the agreed split and move toward a larger
allocation to the market.
Separately, any DBRMPA method—whether “twosided,” “one-sided,” or “formulary”—would face the same
issues associated with international tax base harmonization that apply to unitary taxation systems, as well as the
issues associated with determining destination without a
credit-invoice system. Finally, all versions of the DBRMPA
would maintain the problems of the current arm’s-length
system for transfer pricing on the other intangibles side
of the marketing intangibles vs. other intangibles divide.

IV. Pairing Inbound and Outbound
Minimum Taxes?

This section presents and evaluates a combination of
inbound and outbound minimum taxes as a solution to
the current debate over transfer pricing and the allocation
of taxing rights as among jurisdictions. Minimum taxes
include traditional CFC-based solutions, which rely on
relative immutability of corporate residence, and newer
ideas that combine outbound and inbound minimum
taxes. Such ideas appear to have entered the OECD
debate. “Minimum effective taxation” is also an issue that
Germany has recently raised at the most senior levels in
European Union policy discussions.
Notably, the GILTI and the BEAT could respectively be
described as an attempt to have outbound and inbound
minimum taxes, or as an attempt to ensure minimum
effective taxation. In this Part IV, I will suggest that the
GILTI and the BEAT can be reimagined to suggest a
workable alternative for the medium-term future of the
international tax system.
I expect the United States will continue to describe
the GILTI and the BEAT with our current acronyms.
However, the reconceived system I describe below is perhaps better described as a combination of an outbound
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minimum tax and something like a “reverse CFC” rule.130
The basic concept would be to pair some outbound
minimum tax regime (a reformed GILTI) with defensive
measures that would only be applied to multinationals
parented in countries that do not impose a qualifying
outbound minimum tax.

A. Outbound Minimum Taxes
The GILTI is now highly familiar for the participants at
this conference. At the highest level, the GILTI requires
a U.S. shareholder of CFCs to pay a minimum aggregate
U.S. and foreign tax on its share of the earnings of its
CFCs on a current basis. Unlike other dividend exemption
systems, the structure of the regime imposes tax on most
CFC income, but does so at a lower rate than domestic
income.
As a practical matter the United States is likely to maintain some form of this outbound minimum tax regime
over the medium term. At the present time the Republican
party believes it has renewed American competitiveness
with its corporate rate cut and hopes to protect the basic
structure and rates. Meanwhile, Democrats are proposing
to raise the corporate income tax rate and the GILTI rate
along with it, but have not suggested altering the basic
architecture of the regime. That political playing field
is unsurprising given that at a 50,000 feet level one can
describe the GILTI regime as the Obama Administration
proposal to “Impose a 19 Percent Minimum Tax on
Foreign Income,”131 just enacted at Republican rather
than Democratic rates.
Although the basic architecture of an outbound minimum tax is likely to be a stable feature of U.S. international
tax law, the technical details of that construct are subject
to change. The 2017 legislation is legislatively unstable
in the sense that various provisions expire by their own
terms between 2021 and 2025. It is politically vulnerable
to revision, because it was enacted via a party-line vote.
Finally, it is technically unstable for reasons having to do
both with how some provisions are difficult to administer
and others may create unintended incentives.132
A few examples of political and technical instability of
specific features of the current GILTI construct are worth
mention. At the political level, Democrats are focusing on
the QBAI regime, which exempts a small portion of CFC
income from the minimum tax, as creating (unintended)
incentives for offshoring tangible investment and related
jobs.133 Meanwhile, at the technical level, Dana Trier’s
paper correctly highlights the complexity created by the
QBAI regime, as well as the problems created by the
QBAI regime’s interaction with the treatment of debt.134
Separately, many commentators view the GILTI’s reliance
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on the existing foreign tax credit and subpart F mechanics
to be administratively inadvisable. There are likely more
elegant ways to impose a minimum tax than building a
system based on calculations at the shareholder level using
rules written for entity-level calculations.135 It also is not
clear why elements like foreign base company sales income,
foreign base company services income, and Code Sec.
956 are necessary components of a minimum tax regime.
I view the combination of a stable basic architecture
(an outbound minimum tax regime) and flexibility as to
features and technical/mechanical details of the regime as
an opportunity for meaningful multilateralism.136 From a
U.S. perspective, the pragmatic reality is that GILTI may
be reformed to function more effectively, but the basic
minimum tax concept seems unlikely to be repealed over
the medium term. From a non-U.S. perspective, the key
political fact is that the United States was historically the
biggest impediment to a floor to tax competition. Now the
United States has in effect embraced such a regime, without necessarily settling on the details in any permanent
way. For countries that have wanted a floor on corporate
tax competition and felt the United States was an obstacle
to such a result, the unsettled state of GILTI is an opportunity for meaningful and potentially efficacious dialogue.
Two non-American sovereigns that may find a minimum
tax proposal attractive are Germany and Japan. It is important to understand why: these are export-driven economies.
To the extent source becomes defined as destination, which
is the trend we see in the other proposals discussed in this
paper, these countries’ national interest is to find an alternative to a destination-based income tax system. They and
other export-driven economies might also find minimum
tax systems attractive to the extent that they are concerned
that the incidence of a destination-based income tax is more
similar to that of a consumption tax than it is to a residencebased corporate income tax. The most viable alternative to
a destination-based income tax is a multilaterally agreed
inbound/outbound minimum tax regime that supports a
version of the residence-based system.
A minimum tax regime that undergirds residence-based
taxation is based on concepts that all currently exist in the
law of multiple countries. Therefore, it should be easier
to agree on and implement than a shift to destinationbasis taxation. Moreover, such a regime is more objective
than trying to ascribe relative value to different kinds of
intangibles.
One important problem with any outbound minimum
tax regime is that it applies only to tax-resident MNCs,
and therefore creates incentives to redomicile. Outbound
minimum taxes lower the benefits to a resident MNC
eroding the domestic tax base. However, to the extent
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the United States, or any other country, imposes such
a tax, and no other country does the same, the country
or countries imposing the outbound minimum tax on
resident MNCs discourage corporate tax residence and
encourage foreign tax domiciliation for multinational
enterprises. Senator Portman’s Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations study entitled “Impact of the US Tax Code
on the Market for Corporate Control and Jobs” persuasively
showed that under prior U.S. law “foreign acquirers that
hail from more favorable tax jurisdictions are able to create value simply by restructuring the affairs of the U.S.
target companies to improve their tax profile.”137 The
United States understandably does not want to be in that
world, and other countries would not want to be, either.
I testified to Congress about evidence that an important
medium-term result of pressures for redomiciling MNCs
out of the United States by tax-driven acquisitions of U.S.
firms by foreign firms would be fewer high-quality jobs
for U.S. workers.138 The same would hold true for any
country that unilaterally adopted an outbound minimum
tax without appropriate defensive measures.
Importantly, multiple countries adopting an outbound
minimum tax for resident multinationals alone also would
not in and of itself solve the problems associated with
cross-border M&A to escape that taxpayer-unfavorable
residence country tax net. Without a “defensive measure,”
all it takes is one viable corporate headquarters jurisdiction
to defect and choose not to have an outbound minimum
tax for the dynamic favoring acquisitions by tax-favored
MNCs to take hold. For that reason, given the fungibility
of tax residence for business units (which can be acquired),
new businesses (which can incorporate initially abroad),
and multinationals as a whole (which are routinely
acquired in cross-border M&A transactions) simply differentiating tax burdens based on tax residence, without
measures to discourage avoidance of a basic residence tax
burden, is untenable as a policy option.
1. Relationship of Outbound Minimum Taxes to
German Royalty Barrier. In 2017, Germany enacted
the Act against Harmful Tax Practices with regard to
Licensing of Rights (German EStG 4j). This provision of
German law restricts the tax deduction of royalties and
similar payments made to related parties if such payments
are subject to a non-OECD-compliant preferential tax
regime and are taxed at an effective rate below 25%.139
This rule has a quite targeted scope, but it evolved from
a more general German interest in proposals to encourage or ensure minimum effective taxation. The concept
of encouraging minimum effective taxation at a general
level, rather than on an item-by-item basis, continues to
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be of interest to German policymakers, including at the
finance minister level.140 Importantly, the German idea of
minimum effective taxation as it has developed in EStG 4j
would appear to reflect a country-by-country conception
of minimum effective taxation.141

B. Inbound Minimum Taxes
The U.S. Congress was cognizant of the problems associated with taxing resident multinationals in a harsher way
than non-resident multinationals when it enacted the
2017 Act. The “Unified Framework for Fixing Our Broken
Tax Code” discussed the importance of “rules to level the
playing field between U.S.-headquartered parent companies and foreign-headquartered parent companies.”142 In
reporting the BEAT to the Senate floor, the Senate Finance
Committee explained that “the current U.S. international
tax system makes foreign ownership of almost any asset or
business more attractive than U.S. ownership … creating a
tax-driven incentive for foreign takeovers of U.S. firms …
[and] has created significant financial pressures for U.S.
headquartered companies to re-domicile abroad and shift
income to low-tax jurisdictions.”143 The Senate Finance
Committee’s explanation went on to explain that the
BEAT was supposed to be an administrable way to meet
the promise of the framework to level the playing field.
Unfortunately, the BEAT as enacted does not appear
to have met this goal. However, the concept of using an
inbound tax to defend residence-based taxation is quite
rational. Importantly, the defense of an outbound minimum tax would work best if undertaken via multilateral
coordination.
1. The BEAT That Could Be: A Reverse CFC Rule. Four
high-level changes would be required to convert the BEAT
into a useful inbound base erosion prevention mechanism
that also encourages foreign sovereigns to adopt outbound
minimum taxes. First, the BEAT would need to be
amended so as not to apply to multinationals tax resident
in a jurisdiction that imposed a qualifying minimum tax
regime. The definition of a qualifying outbound minimum
tax would presumably follow the contours of a multilateral
agreement. Second, the reformed BEAT would need to
be limited to actual base-eroding payments. Most importantly this would mean repealing the disallowance of
foreign tax credits and NOLs in present law BEAT. Third,
the base erosion percentage limitation would need to be
excised. Finally, the BEAT would need to be expanded to
cover at least the value of intangible property embedded
in goods, or perhaps to cover goods in their entirety. As
explained below, the last of these is viable if the purpose of
the reformed BEAT were to incentivize other jurisdictions
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to adopt qualifying outbound minimum taxes, rather than
to raise revenue.
The inbound regime (“BEAT 2.0”) described above
could be accurately described as a “defensive measure.”
The base amount would still be determined by taking the
taxpayer’s taxable income increased by certain base erosion
items. As in the current regime, taxpayers would multiply
the BEAT base amount by a given percent of the BEAT
base. If that amount exceeded their otherwise-applicable
U.S. tax liability, they would pay the difference between
the BEAT amount and their regular tax liability.
However, unlike the current BEAT, this regime would
apply only to multinational groups that were not subject at
the parent level to an (internationally-recognized) qualifying outbound minimum tax. As a result, countries whose
multinationals operate extensively in the U.S. market
would have an incentive to adopt qualifying outbound
minimum taxes. The incentives in this regard would be
much stronger if the United States and the European Union
and/or Japan were to take such steps in a coordinated fashion. In a multilaterally agreed minimum tax regime with
coordinated defensive measures, MNCs would have strong
incentives to remain headquartered in key jurisdictions that
had qualifying outbound minimum taxes and were thus
part of the new international consensus.
Various criticisms of this approach are available. Let me
address just three. First, this approach would require some
degree of agreement with respect to the acceptable outer
boundaries of outbound minimum tax regimes. Minimum
standards with respect to an outbound minimum tax
regime represent a certain degree of tax harmonization.
Some might fear this would represent a slippery slope
toward even further tax harmonization, and that such constraints on tax competition are inappropriate. However, I
would suggest to such critics that tax sovereignty is a basic
interest of national sovereigns, and that a small step in the
direction of coordinated rules may not in this case be a
particularly slippery slope.
Moreover, note that the minimum tax regime likely
requires much less tax harmonization than the DBRMPA.
Inbound minimum taxes used as defensive measures to
backstop the outbound minimum tax regime require
determining some effective tax rate for the outbound
regimes of jurisdictions that formally impose an outbound minimum tax. Otherwise countries could adopt
an outbound minimum tax at the appropriate rate on a
very narrowly defined base.
But note that the harmonized base definition issues are
actually less extensive than in the DBRMPA. Unlike in
a DBRMPA (or user participation), in the minimum tax
structure the national rules that determine the base from
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which the effective tax rate is measured only matters with
respect to the question of whether a national defensive
measure is imposed. As a result, the pressures for countries
to agree on a shared definition of the appropriate tax base
are low. In the minimum effective taxation regime, the base
only matters for the purpose of measuring the effective
tax rate imposed in another jurisdiction, rather than for
purposes of actually splitting up the tax base. As a result,
inconsistent national definitions are fine within some
wide margins. In contrast, in the DBRMPA and under
user participation, the absence of base harmonization can
have consequences in every case, because both of those
approaches are unitary tax systems. Consistent definitions
are needed to split up a base and therefore avoid double
taxation. As a result, the pressures to harmonize are higher.
Second, Part IIIB.1 highlights why it is difficult to write
regulations that separate embedded intangibles from the
overall value of a tangible good in an administrable way.
Sales of products containing embedded intangibles present
a challenge for any inbound base protection rule that is
meant to be WTO-compliant while raising revenue; rather
than acting as an incentive for other countries to adopt a
regime that is exempt from the inbound base protection
rule/defensive measure.144
In contrast, if the inbound base erosion/defensive
measure rule applies only to multinationals that are not
subject to a qualifying outbound minimum tax regime,
and if (for example) the United States, the European
Union, and perhaps Japan have all adopted such regimes,
then “rough justice” that erred on the side of inclusion
in destination country tax bases would not be a problem.145 Indeed, onerous rough justice would help ensure
widespread adoption of qualifying outbound minimum
taxes. As more jurisdictions adopted qualifying outbound
minimum taxes, the treatment of COGS in cross-border
transactions with corporations’ whose parent entity was tax
resident in a jurisdiction without a minimum tax would
become ever less important.146
Third, some might suggest that the minimum tax
solution would not stop some sovereigns from separately
enacting unilateral measures to ring-fence and tax large
U.S. tech firms participating in the digital economy. I
have sympathy for this critique. We are living through a
mercantilist and politically charged moment in international economic law (and the United States is not exempt
from this characterization). In the current environment,
some sovereigns do seem to want a shift of the “digital”
tax base, rather than to ensure a single level of tax on
corporate income. The minimum tax proposal does not
affect a shift of the tax base from residence to destination,
and does not serve a mercantilist end in the digital sector.
110

Taxes The Tax Magazine ®

Thus, some sovereigns might take unilateral measures to
accomplish their desired ends with respect to the digital
sector on top of a minimum tax. Indeed, this concern may
motivate the marketing intangibles proposal.
However, given that the United States already has a
GILTI and is unlikely to repeal it in the medium term,
I do not believe the “but it won’t stop other countries’
digital proposals” critique substantially changes the U.S.
policy calculus. Rather, if other sovereigns see redeeming
features in the basic outlines of the American status quo,
that outcome is in the national interest of the United
States. This conclusion does not change if it turns out that
multilateral agreement on a minimum effective taxation
regime does not also completely stop unilateral efforts by
some sovereigns to target the U.S. tech sector. No proposal
(including the marketing intangibles proposal) can fully
stop such efforts in any case; the political reality abroad
that views the U.S. tech sector with distrust is simply too
strong. What is important is that an agreement to implement a minimum tax block a multilateral agreement on a
digital-only proposal, and also that the foreign countries
most interested in a minimum tax outcome commit
(including on a bilateral basis) not to pursue digital-only
measures.147 In other words, although the tech sector is
an important U.S. national interest, it is clearly not the
only U.S. national interest in the field of international
taxation. Rather, our broadest interest should be to stabilize the international tax system generally, ensure that its
architecture remains principled, provide certainty for all of
our businesses, and bring our new international tax system
more closely into alignment with international norms.
Although a multilateral agreement on a minimum
effective taxation regime would not necessarily stop every
foreign sovereign from enacting tech-specific tax proposals,
it would likely discourage many sovereigns from doing so.
To provide a simple example, if the German government
were to agree to a minimum tax proposal as a solution to
the digital tax question, and commit not to enact a digitalonly proposal, it seems unlikely they would renege over
the medium term. In my judgment the diplomatic and
technocratic political culture of Germany is not such that
it would agree to a solution to the digital issue that involved
a minimum tax multilaterally, and then shortly thereafter
enact a digitally-focused tax. A similar observation might
be made about many governments (consider Japan for
example). If the European Commission were to sign on
to a minimum effective taxation agreement to settle the
digital tax debate, it is also unlikely that the letter of the
agreement would be abandoned. In that particular case,
from a U.S. perspective having both EU member states and
the Commission commit to an agreement is important.
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The United States should insist at the OECD that the
Commission be an independent party to any agreement.
To address any concerns about individual countries
behaving perfidiously, the United States should consider
including a punitive measure in its reformed inbound
minimum tax (BEAT 2.0) to discourage the imposition of particularly destructive taxes. For example, in
my view today’s gross basis turnover taxes on digital
business represent a relatively transparent mercantilist
effort to target U.S. firms. U.S. law could be structured
so as to apply the reformed BEAT to jurisdictions that
imposed taxes targeted at U.S. MNCs, even if they
adopted a minimum tax regime. As a statutory matter
one could use Code Sec. 891 as a model in this respect.
Such a tool would be perceived to have legitimacy
internationally if it were tied to a multilateral agreement
on minimum taxation. International legitimacy (even
if not complete acceptance) should be an important
consideration for those of us concerned with reestablishing stability in the broader international economic
law environment.148
Finally, one might be concerned that the United States
itself might want to abandon the minimum tax at a future
date. The United States could unilaterally overcome its
fiscal challenges and obtain fiscal leeway to lessen its reliance on our economically inefficient corporate double tax
by adopting a new revenue source, such as a VAT. At that
juncture a multilateral minimum tax regime would function as an unwelcome constraint. However, a new revenue
source is not in the offing at this time in the United States.
Moreover, it seems unlikely that the political process will
soon sanction reducing corporate tax rates by increasing
individual income taxes. As a result, anti-base erosion
measures will probably continue to be needed over the
medium term.

Conclusion
The international tax system that emerged after World War
II had the important advantage of being nestled within a
broader world order that, in Henry Kissinger’s classic formulation, “had the advantage of uniform perceptions.”149
Countries accepted that the United States led the post-war
international economic order of the free world. Almost as
a minor corollary, countries generally accepted that the
United States led the development of the transfer pricing
regime, too.
In contrast, few observers would claim that today’s
international economic climate features uniform perceptions. The current state of international tax affairs reflects
the broader disarray.
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One important goal in this difficult environment should
be to reestablish some stability to the international tax
regime. Among other things, doing so could contribute to
the broader goal of stabilizing our system of international
economic law more generally.
If medium-term international tax stability is a goal, any
answer to the questions raised by the digital economy cannot be limited to any definition of the digital economy,
because no corporate international tax problem is unique
to the digital economy. Moreover, the features of the digital
economy that proponents of a digital-only solution might
point to are gradually expanding to encompass the bulk
of the economy.
However, the digitization of the economy does force
policymakers to confront a basic choice between destination-based corporate income taxation and residence-based
corporate income taxation. A shift from our residencebased system to a destination-based corporate income tax,
if agreed to by the major economies, is certainly a viable
option. But moving to a DBRPA would require significantly higher levels of information exchange and collection
assistance than currently exist. More fundamentally, a shift
all the way to a destination-based corporate income tax
presently seems politically implausible.
Indeed, the current debate internationally does not
include a full move to destination-based corporate income
taxation as an alternative. Instead there are two proposals
that in effect split the baby between destination-based
corporate income taxation and residence-based corporate
income taxation. These are the user participation theory
and the DBRMPA.
The latter “compromise” proposal, the DBRMPA, is
principled and, at the 100,000-foot level, may appear
politically attractive. It does change the balance of allocation of taxing rights. However, the DBRMPA creates a
new set of administrative challenges for which we may not
have solutions, while leaving the problems of the current
transfer pricing system in place, and adding a new source
of fundamental controversy—the appropriate split of
excess returns between the market and the current transfer
pricing system. These issues could play out as between
governments and between governments and MNCs with
respect to every cross-border transaction. What analyzing
the DBRMPA highlights is that compromise between a
destination-based income tax and a residence-based corporate income tax, even principled compromise, is hard
to administer. Splitting the baby is probably unwise. If
policymakers wish for a destination-based income tax,
they should really try to go all the way there.
That said, if policymakers consider the compromise
that is the DBRMPA, they should abandon the notion
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of measuring the relative value of marketing and nonmarketing intangibles and accept a simple formulary
split between the two residual return categories. It seems
to me that in a DBRMPA system, a formulary approach,
ideally backstopped by mandatory binding arbitration,
is the only way to control the extent of tax controversy.
Note, however, that there is currently no international
law mechanism that would easily ensure that countries
would respect an agreement to a specific allocation of the
excess return between marketing intangibles and other
intangibles. Bilateral tax treaties are not well-suited to
enshrining such an approach; a multilateral treaty (not
the MLI of the BEPS project) might be needed.150
In contrast to destination-basis corporate income taxation, a minimum tax regime that undergirds residencebased taxation is based on concepts that all currently exist
in the law of multiple countries. Therefore, it should be
easier to agree on and implement than the DBRMPA,
because it does not require tackling all the issues involved
in a shift to destination-basis corporate income taxation.
A minimum tax regime also (perhaps counterintuitively)
requires less extensive international coordination than
a DBRMPA. Finally, in a multilaterally agreed regime
that included both outbound and inbound minimum

taxes, MNCs would have strong incentives to remain
headquartered in key jurisdictions that had qualifying
outbound minimum taxes. Thus, the weakest point of a
residence-based system—redomiciliation and tax-driven
cross-border M&A—would be addressed. Compared
to a partial move to destination-basis corporate income
taxation, undergirding the residence-based regime with
outbound and inbound minimum taxes seems both less
disruptive and more administrable.
What is the mechanism for getting there? Success will
require discussions around both substance and process
to take place at the OECD. Americans must be aware
that it will not be the sort of discussion the United States
tended to have at the OECD a generation or two ago.
The United States no longer is the uncontested leader of
the capitalist world, and it does not have an uncontested
leadership position in international tax, either. Rather,
the best hope in the 21st century is to use the OECD in
international tax the way Metternich used the Congress
of Vienna in European military affairs in the 19th
century—as a mechanism to overcome quite significant
differences in perspective via a balance of power, and
in the process (re)build legitimacy, shared values, and a
stable equilibrium.
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(IFA) annual conference in Seoul in September.
See Stephanie Soong Johnston, OECD Makes
Headway on Long-Term Answers to Tax Digital
Economy, 91 Tax Notes Int’l 1164 (Sept. 10,
2018); Stephanie Soong Johnston, News Analysis:
Geeking Out: Digital Taxation Debate Goes Viral
at IFA Congress, 92 Tax Notes Int’l 19 (Oct. 1,
2018).
The term “super-normal return” has an understood meaning in economic theory. The term
“excess return” does not. I view the returns
for which taxing rights may be reallocated in
a DBRMPA to be related to but not always the
same as the “super-normal return” concept
in economics, and so I use the term “excess
returns” going forward in this paper.
“More than half of U.S. imports from its main
non-NAFTA trading partners (with the exception of China and Italy) are also intra-firm
transactions. In contrast, U.S. exports to its main
non-NAFTA trading partners are predominantly
arm’s-length—53–65 percent of U.S. exports
to large European Union and Asian countries
(France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Netherlands,
and United Kingdom …) fit this description.”
World Bank, Arm’s-Length Trade: A Source of
Post-Crisis Trade Weakness, Global Economic
Prospects Special Focus, 2 (June 2017) http://
pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/222281493655511173/
Global-Economic-Prospects-June-2017-TopicalIssue-Arms-length-trade.pdf.

6

7

8

See, e.g., OECD, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting Project, Aligning Transfer Pricing
Outcomes with Value Creation, Actions 8-10-2015,
9 (2015) https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264241244en [https://perma.cc/25E8-UCKY] [hereinafter
“BEPS ACTIONS 8–10”]. The arm’s-length principle requires that transactions between associated enterprises be priced as if the enterprises
were independent, such that the pricing reflects
what third parties operating at arm’s length
would agree upon with one another.
John Neighbour, Transfer Pricing, Keeping It at
Arm’s Length, OECD Observer, 29 (Apr. 21, 2002)
www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.
php/aid/670/Transfer_pricing:_Keeping_it_
at_arms_length.html. Of course, important
academic critiques and alternative proposals
existed before the onset of the BEPS project.
See generally, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Splitting the
Unsplittable: Toward a Formulary Approach to
Allocating Residuals Under Profit Split, Univ. of
Michigan Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper
Series, Paper No. 378 (2013) (proposing that the
OECD use formulary apportionment to allocate
residual profit of the “profit split method”).
See Matthias Schroger, Transfer Pricing: Next
Steps in the International Debate, Tax Policy
Challenges in the 21st Century, 310–312 (Karoline
Spies & Raffaele Petruzzi eds., 2014). Whether
one views that outcome as good policy or not,
the relatively clear intellectual boundaries for
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these disputes were an outgrowth of the fact
that discussion of transfer pricing was limited
to tax administrators and other specialists.
See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Between Formulary
Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines: A
Proposal for Reconciliation, 2 World Tax J. 3, 3
(2010) (arguing that while debate quieted with
regard to the arm’s-length standard after the
adoption of the 1995 regulations and OECD
guidelines, the arm’s-length standard is unworkable and should be replaced by formulary
apportionment); David Spencer, Senior Adviser,
Tax Justice Network, Statement by the Tax Justice
Network (Mar. 21, 2012, 5:07 AM) http://taxjustice.
blogspot.com/2012/03/tjn-statement-ontransfer-pricing.html (asserting that the “OECD’s
theory of the arm’s-length principle no longer
applies to multinational enterprises which are
highly integrated”).
See generally Stephen Timms, Fin. Sec’y to
Treasury UK, Address at the OECD Tax &
Development Conference (Jan. 27, 2010); G-20,
Cannes Summit Final Declaration—Building our
Common Future: Renewed Collective Action for
the Benefit of All (Draft of November 4) (Nov. 4,
2011) www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannesdeclaration-111104-en.html; see also Arun Jaitley,
Hon. Fin. Minister, India, A Tax Vision for India,
Peterson Institute for International Economics
(Apr. 16, 2015).
Ed Kleinbard deserves credit for naming the
phenomenon and writing the most well-read
article about how U.S. MNC international tax
planning in the pre-BEPS era worked. See
generally Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless
Income, 11 Fla. Tax Rev. 699 (2011). However,
his U.S. outbound centric view created real
difficulties for the United States as a matter
of international tax diplomacy. U.S. tax reform
is highlighting the extent to which foreign
multinationals, especially those headquartered in Europe, have been achieving stateless
income with respect to revenues earned in the
United States for many years. Unfortunately,
no European academic has emerged who
is willing to publicize and generalize about
aggressive tax planning by European MNCs
in the manner Ed did for U.S.-headquartered
MNCs.
See generally Mindy Herzfeld, Input Needed on
Transfer Pricing Drafts, 77 Tax Notes Int’l 392
(Feb. 2, 2015); China International Tax Center/IFA
China Branch, Comments on Discussion Draft on
the Use of Profit Splits in the Context of Global
Value Chains and other Related Transfer Pricing
Issues (Feb. 6, 2015). U.S. officials, for example,
have bemoaned this phenomenon in multiple
public appearances.
See, e.g., comments Marlies de Ruiter, Interview:
OECD’s de Ruiter Says Forthcoming Changes
to Transfer Pricing Guidelines Achieve Correct
Balance, 24 Tax Mgmt. Transfer Pricing Rep. 775
(Oct. 15, 2015) [hereinafter “de Ruiter Interview
Comments”].
See generally BEPS ACTIONS 8–10, supra note
7; see also Michael L. Schler, The Arm’s-Length
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Standard After Altera and BEPS, 149 Tax Notes
1149 (Nov. 30, 2015) (discussing ambiguities in
the revised transfer pricing guidelines associated with attributing income to various forms
of activity, control of risk, or something else).
Public presentations offer an illustration of
this disagreement: the national delegates and
OECD officials that participated in negotiations of the revised transfer pricing guidelines
began providing conflicting interpretations
of what those guidelines meant almost
immediately after the OECD’s new transfer
pricing guidelines were released. Compare
de Ruiter Interview Comments, supra note 14
with comments of Brian Jenn, quoted in Ryan
Finley, Transfer Pricing Report Obscured by
Terminology, 80 Tax Notes Int’l 229, 230 (Oct.
19, 2015).
See BEPS ACTIONS 8–10, supra note 7,
¶¶6.42–6.46.
Cf. The Global Tax Environment in 2016 and
Implications for International Tax Reform:
Hearing Before the H.R. Comm. on Ways & Means,
114th Cong. (2016) (Testimony of Itai Grinberg,
Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law
Center) https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/20160224fc-GrinbergTestimony.pdf.
OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on
Capital: Condensed Version 2017, art. 7 (2007)
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/publication/
mtc_cond-2017-en [hereinafter “OECD Model
Treaty”].
Not all countries adopted the AOA; as such the
attribution of profits to PEs and various countries’ interpretations and practices with respect
to Article 7 have continued to vary considerably.
See Commentary to Article 7, para 2 of the OECD
Model Treaty (para 16 et seq).
The OECD agrees that this basic principle
applies regardless of whether a tax administration has adopted the AOA as explicated in
the 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits
to Permanent Establishments. See OECD,
Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits
to Permanent Establishments, BEPS Action 7,
7 (2018) www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/
additional-guidance-attribution-of-profits-topermanent-establishments-BEPS-action-7.pdf
[hereinafter “OECD Additional Guidance”].
OECD, 2010 Report on The Attribution of Profits
to Permanent Establishments, ¶10 (July 22, 2010)
www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/45689524.
pdf.
These changes primarily involved ensuring
that commissionaire arrangements could not
be used to avoid a PE and modifications to
the rules on specific activity exemptions. The
latter change was viewed by the OECD as being
“particularly relevant in the case of digitalised
businesses.” See, e.g., OECD Additional Guidance,
supra note 22, at 7.
See Commentary to Article 7, para 2 of the OECD
Model Treaty, para 16 (“the basic approach
incorporated in the paragraph for the purposes
of determining what are the profits that are
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attributable to the permanent establishment
is therefore to require the determination of
the profits under the fiction that the permanent
establishment is a separate enterprise and that
such an enterprise is independent from the rest
of the enterprise of which it is a part as well
as from any other person … that faction corresponds to the arm’s length principle which is
also applicable, under the provisions of Article
9, for purposes of adjusting the profits of associated enterprises.”)
The PE concept of dependence has been with
us since the PE test was first developed in the
League of Nations, before the adoption of the
arm’s-length standard. See generally Richard J.
Vann, Tax Treaties: The Secret Agent’s Secrets, 3
BTR 345 (2006).
Id.
I acknowledge that there are enforcement
challenges associated with requiring smaller
businesses without physical presence to pay
tax in a jurisdiction, but I do not view that as a
first-order issue.
Note also the inclusion of a digital services tax
(DST) in the UK budget of October 29, 2018. The
DST represents another instance of UK unilateralism in the midst of a multilateral project in
which it claims to be a fully committed participant. HM Treasury, Budget 2018 Digital Services
Tax (Oct. 29, 2018) https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/752172/DST_web.
pdf.
Dan Neidle et al., The UK Diverted Profits Tax:
Final Legislation Published, Clifford Chance,
Mar. 25, 2015, www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2015/03/the_uk_diverted_profitstaxfinallegislatio.html.
It is still known by that moniker. Vanessa Houlder,
“Google tax” Take Swells to £281m as Levy Starts to
Bite, Financial Times, Sept. 13, 2017, www.ft.com/
content/4f7aed86-989f-11e7-a652-cde3f882dd7b.
See generally HM Revenue & Customs [HMRC],
Transfer Pricing and Diverted Profits Tax statistics, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/729876/Transfer_Pricing_and_
Diverted_Profits_Tax_statistics.pdf (estimating
an increase in the “DPT Yield” from £31m in
2015/16 to £388m in 2017/18). DPT charging
notices raised 57% of the revenue HMRC attributed to the DPT in 2017/2018. The remainder was
raised by what HMRC referred to as “behavioral
change,” the central element of which was
“additional Corporation Tax paid as a result of
HMRC intervention to ensure that profits earned
in the UK are taxed in the UK.” That is to say,
HMRC threatened to charge DPT and instead
a company “voluntarily” opted to pay more UK
corporation tax.
Officials from the OECD and the IMF, as well as
the canonical Vogel treatise, generally define
taxes as legally compulsory and unrequited
payments to a government that do not provide
a specific economic benefit. Moreover, to qualify
as a tax under these definitions, the required
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payment must be a result of law of general
applicability that is reasonably clear in its
application. See, e.g., Werner Haslehner et al.,
Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions,
Art. 2, at 26 (Ekkehart Reimer & Alexander Rust
eds., 4th ed., 2015); Ken Messere et al., Tax Policy:
Theory and Practice in OECD Countries 240
(2003); Ruud De Mooij & Michael Keen, Taxing
Principles: Making the Best of a Necessary
Evil, 51(4) Finance & Development, Dec. 2014.
So, to ask a provocative question—does the
DPT meet that test? Note that after France
enacted a DPT-like tax, the French constitutional
council struck the tax down on the basis that
it gave the tax authority too much discretion
to selectively target individual taxpayers,
and therefore was not constitutional under
French law. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC]
[Constitutional Court] decision No. 2016-744 DC,
Dec. 29, 2016 (Fr.) www.conseil-constitutionnel.
fr/sites/default/files/as/root/bank_mm/
decisions/2016744dc/2016744dc.pdf; see also
Davide Anghileri, France’s Diverted Profits Tax
Ruled Unconstitutional, MNE Tax (Jan. 4, 2017)
https://mnetax.com/frances-diverted-profittax-ruled-unconstitutional-18873.
In the Belgian state aid case, the Commission
wrote that, “for any avoidance of doubt, the
arm’s length principle that the Commission
applies in its state aid assessment is not that
derived from Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax
Convention and the OECD TP Guidelines, which
are nonbinding instruments, but a general principle of equal treatment in taxation falling within
the application of Article 107(1) of the Treaty,
which binds the Member States and from whose
scope the national tax rules are not excluded.”
Commission Decision of 11.1.2016 on the Excess
Profit Exemption State Aid Scheme SA.37667
Implemented by Belgium, C(2015) 9837 final, para
150, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/
cases/256735/256735_1748545_185_2.pdf.
Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council: A Fair
and Efficient Tax System in the European Union
for the Digital Single Market, 9, COM(2017) 547
final (Sept. 21, 2017) https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/communication_taxation_digital_single_market_en.pdf.
Id., at 10.
That position paper was released after tax
reform was introduced in the U.S. House and
U.S. Senate, but before the 2017 Act passed.
See HM Treasury, Budget 2018 Digital Services Tax
(Oct. 29, 2018) https://assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/752172/DST_web.pdf.
See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, India Budget
2018: Aiming for the Bullseye, 28 (Feb. 2018) www.
pwc.in/assets/pdfs/budget/2018/aiming_for_the_
bullseye_pwc_union_budget_2018_booklet.pdf.
See Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] [German
Income Tax Act], §4j; see also, e.g., EY, German
Parliament adopts legislation on limitation of
tax deduction of royalties and tax exemption
of restructuring gains (May 2, 2017).
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Id. (“If (i) the recipient of the payments or (ii)
another party related to the German payer
incurs expenses for license rights from which
the rights derive that are licensed to the German
payer, and the recipient of those payments
benefits from an unqualified IP regime, then the
deduction of the German licensee’s payments
are denied to the extent the ultimate payment
recipient faces an effective rate below 25%.”)
See www.gov.uk/government/publications/
offshore-receipts-from-intangible-property/
income-tax-offshore-receipts-in-respect-ofintangible-property.
International Tax Reform: Hearing Before the
S. Fin. Comm., 115th Cong. (2017) (testimony of
Itai Grinberg, Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center) www.finance.senate.
gov/imo/media/doc/Grinberg%20October%20
2017%20SFC%20International%20Tax%20
Testimony%20FINAL.PDF [hereinafter “Grinberg
Senate Testimony”].
26 USC §960(d)(1).
New York State Bar Ass’n [NYSBA] Tax Section,
Report No. 1394 on the GILTI Provisions of
the Code 15 (May 4, 2018) www.nysba.org/
Sections/Tax/Tax_Section_Reports/Tax_
Reports_2018/1394_Report.html.
Given the FTC limitations imposed because of
the GILTI FTC basket, in many situations the
combined United States and foreign tax rate on
CFC income will be well in excess of 13.125%.
Indeed, neither Camp “Option C,” as eventually
proposed in HR 1 2014 when Representative
Camp (Republican from Michigan) was chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee,
nor the “Option Y” and “Option Z” proposals
released by Senator Baucus (Democrat from
Montana) in 2013 when he was Chair of the
Senate Finance Committee included a QBAI
concept. Options Y and Z also used a partial
exemption/partial full inclusion and foreign tax
credit and expense disallowance mechanisms
that may represent a more sensible and elegant
way to address limitations on foreign tax credits
and related expense allocation issues in a minimum tax regime than the mechanism ultimately
adopted by the United States in 2017.
OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the
Digital Economy, BEPS Action 1: 2014 Deliverable,
112 (Sept. 16, 2014) (“The comprehensiveness
of the BEPS Action Plan will ensure that, once
the different measures are implemented in a
co-ordinated manner, taxation is more aligned
with where economic activities take place … with
the aim to put an end to the phenomenon of socalled stateless income.”). In fact large U.S. firms
based in Silicon Valley were achieving very low
rates of tax on their foreign earnings under the
old U.S. international tax regime. See European
Commission, Report of the Commission Expert
Group on Taxation of the Digital Economy (May
28, 2014). Consequently, European sovereigns
took the position that special measures might
be needed to solve this problem, unless the
United States acted and imposed tax on the
relevant firms. At the same time, all the large
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developed economies said they had no interest in shifting the balance between source and
residence. France, Germany and the United
Kingdom were particularly strong on this point.
For a balanced perspective on the broader question, see Wolfgang Schön, Ten Questions About
Why and How to Tax the Digitalized Economy, 72
Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4/5, 79–81 (2018).
26 USC §59A(a). Code Sec. 59A is effective for
“base erosion payments” paid or accrued in
taxable years beginning after December 31, 2017.
Code Sec. 59A(b)(1). Regular tax liability is
defined in Code Sec. 26(b). The applicable credits are: the excess of “the credits allowed under
this chapter against such regular tax liability”
over, the sum of those “allowed under section 38
for the taxable year which is properly allocable
to the research credit determined under section
41(a)”; and “the portion of the applicable section 38 credits not in excess of 80 percent of the
lesser of the amount of such credits.” Code Sec.
59A(b)(1)(B). Applicable Code Sec. 38 credits are
defined in Code Sec. 59A(b)(4).
Code Sec. 59A(d). To be more precise, base
erosion payments include any amount paid
or accrued by the taxpayer to a foreign person
which is a related party of the taxpayer and
with respect to which a deduction is allowable,
any amount paid or accrued by the taxpayer
to a foreign person which is a related party of
the taxpayer in connection with the acquisition
by the taxpayer from such person of property
of a character subject to the allowance for
depreciation (or amortization in lieu of depreciation, reinsurance payments paid or accrued
by the taxpayer to a foreign person which is a
related party, and certain other payments to an
expatriated entity which is a related party of the
taxpayer which result in a reduction of the gross
receipts of the taxpayer.
An item included in COGS can qualify as a base
erosion payment if it is paid to certain inverted
corporations or members of an expanded affiliated group of an inverted corporation. See Code
Sec. 59A(d)(4).
Code Sec. 59A(e)(3) treats those persons classified as a single employer under Code Sec. 52(a),
with some modification, as a single taxpayer for
the purposes of calculating gross receipts and
base erosion percentage.
Regulated investment companies, real estate
investment trusts, and S corporations are also
exempt from the BEAT.
See NYSBA Tax Section, Report No. 1397 on Base
Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax 6 (July 16, 2018) www.
nysba.org/Sections/Tax/Tax_Section_Reports/
Tax_Reports_2018/1397_Report.html. The report
politely explains a number of the ways in which
the BEAT as enacted functions poorly. Certain
drafting errors associated with the current BEAT
were deemed sufficiently problematic that the
NYSBA felt compelled to write that “we believe
that Treasury has authority to construe the
provision logically in regulations to implement
its legislative purpose, even in the absence of
literal statutory support.”
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Disregarded credits include foreign tax credits,
20% of low-income housing credits (Code Sec.
42(a)), 20% of renewable energy production
credits (Code Sec. 45(a)), and 20% of Code
Sec. 46 investment credits allocable to the
energy credit (Code Sec. 48). Research and
Experimentation credits are not disregarded
for purposes of establishing the hypothetical
regular tax amount against which BEAT liability
is in effect compared.
For examples and a formula, see generally
Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: The BEAT
in a Diagram and an Easy-to-Use Spreadsheet,
Tax Notes (June 26, 2018) www.taxnotes.com/
tax-reform/economic-analysis-beat-diagramand-easy-use-spreadsheet.
Code Sec. 59A(i).
Part II of this paper draws heavily from a piece I
recently published in the British Tax Review. Itai
Grinberg, User Participation in Value Creation,
British Tax Rev. (forthcoming, 2018).
See, e.g., Michael P. Devereux & John Vella,
Implications of Digitalization for International
Corporate Tax Reform (Oxford Univ. Centre for
Business Taxation, Working Paper No. 17/07, 2017)
www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_
Taxation/Docs/Publications/Working_Papers/
Series_17/WP1707.pdf; Allison Christians, Taxing
According to Value Creation, 90 Tax Notes Int’l
1379 (June 18, 2018); Joanna Hey, “Taxation Where
Value is Created” and the OECD/G20 Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting Initiative, 72 Bull. Intl. Taxn.
4/5 (2018).
Id.
See, e.g., HM Treasury, Corporate Tax and The
Digital Economy: Position Paper Update, ¶1.1
(Mar. 2018) https://assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/689240/corporate_tax_
and_the_digital_economy_update_web.pdf
[hereinafter “HMT Position Paper Update”]. A
number of other reforms for the international
tax system are also described by their advocates
as reflecting the “value creation principle.”
One can best make sense of this development
if one thinks of claiming the mantle of “value
creation” as simply a claim that the reform being
discussed should be the new multilateral norm.
European Commission Memorandum
MEMO/18/214, Questions and Answers on Fair
and Efficient Tax System in the EU for the Digital
Single Market (Mar. 21, 2018) http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-2141_en.htm.
See HM Treasury, Corporate Tax and The
Digital Economy: Position Paper, ¶3.18 (Nov.
2017) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/661458/corporate_tax_and_the_
digital_economy_position_paper.pdf.
Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council: A Fair and
Efficient Tax System in the European Union for
the Digital Single Market, supra note 35, 9; OECD,
Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation—
Interim Report 2018 (2018), supra note 3, para
47, at 28.
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These businesses all exhibit what economists
call “ indirect network effects.” D. Evans & R.
Schmalensee, Matchmakers: The New Economics
of Multisided Platforms, 667 (2016). Indirect
network effects exist where the value of the
two-sided platform to one group of participants
depends on how many members of a different
group participate. Evans & Schmalensee 25.
Airbnb, Uber, and other businesses that intermediate transactions between groups of buyers
of goods and services and groups of sellers of
goods and services also share this feature that
the value they provides increases as the number
of participants on both sides of the platform
increases.
See Lloyd’s, Annual Report, 3 (2017) www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/globalassets/documents/
investors/2017/2017_lbg_annual_report_v3.pdf
(approx. 85% of the risks insured by Lloyd’s are
non-UK risks).
See id. (only 13% of the capital in the Lloyd’s
market comes from the UK insurance industry).
Lloyd’s, Lloyd’s in the United States, 2 (2016)
www.lloyds.com/lloyds-around-the-world/
americas/us-homepage/about-us.
Or, as HMT puts it user participation in reviewing
and rating “services provided by third parties
is crucial in regulating what appears on the
platform and establishing an important trust
mechanism for other users.” HMT Position Paper
Update, supra note 63, ¶ 2.24.
See Lloyd’s, Market Bulletin Y5170: Electronic
Placement Mandate (Mar. 20, 2018) www.lloyds.
com/market-resources/requirements-andstandards/electronic-placement.
See, e.g., Thibault Degrande, Frederic
Vannieuwenborg, Sofie Verbrugge & Didier
Colle, Multi-Sided Platforms for the Internet of
Things, 372–381 (2018).
For high-level discussion, see, e.g.,
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2017 Automotive
Industry Trends: The Future Depends on
I m p r ov i n g R e t u r n s o n C a p i t a l ( 2 0 1 7 )
www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/2017Automotive-Industry-Trends.pdf.
Chin-Lung Hsu & Judy Chuan-Chuan Lin, An
Empirical Examination of Consumer Adoption
of Internet of Things Services: Network
Externalities and Concern for Information
Privacy Perspectives, 62 Computers Human
Behav. 516–527 (2016). Additional projections
suggest that 30 billion IoT devices by the year
2020 may be a conservative estimate. Global
information firms estimate that the number
of IoT devices connected worldwide already
exceeds the thirty billion threshold, see IHS
Markit, IoT Trend Watch 2018, 4 (2018), and
industry professionals have proposed that
the number of devices “could approach 100
billion by the end of 2040.” See Kathryn Cave,
What Will the Internet Look Like in 2040?, IDG
Connect (Sept. 8, 2015) www.idgconnect.com/
blog-abstract/10383/what-internet-look-2040.
Id. IHS Markit, IoT Trend Watch 2018, 4 (2018).
See HMT Position Paper Update, supra note 63,
¶3.7.

77

78

79

80

81
82
83

84

85

86

87

See HMT Position Paper Update, supra note 63,
¶¶3.62–3.75.
European Commission, Proposal for a Council
Directive on the common system of a digital
services tax on revenues resulting from the
provision of certain digital services, COM(2018)
148 final (Mar. 21, 2018) https://ec.europa.
eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/
proposal_common_system_digital_services_
tax_21032018_en.pdf. European Commission,
Proposal for a Council Directive laying down
rules relating to the corporate taxation of a
significant digital presence, COM(2018) 147 final
(Mar. 21, 2018) https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_
customs/sites/taxation/files/proposal_significant_digital_presence_21032018_en.pdf.
Id., at 89. See Paul Oosterhuis, Skadden Arps LLP,
Residual Profit Allocation Proposal at Oxford
University Summer Conference 2016 (June 27,
2016), available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=
AjSxfUBMHnY&list=PLtXf43N26Zids6PowkWDV7
oQo7HwoNspy&index=8&t=0s; see also Michael
Devereux, Residual Profit Allocation Proposal
at Brookings/Tax Policy Center Conference on
“A Corporate Tax for the 21st Century” (July 14,
2016), available at www.taxpolicycenter.org/
sites/default/files/residual-profit-allocationproposal_2.pdf.
Analyzing the DBRMPA is also easier if one is
familiar with formulary apportionment, salesbased formulary apportionment, and residual
formulary apportionment. Those ideas, as well
as the DBRPA, were described in a paper for the
2016 iteration of this conference authored by
Joe Andrus & Paul Oosterhuis, Transfer Pricing
After BEPS: Where Are We and Where Should We
Be Going, available at www.skadden.com/-/
media/files/publications/2017/03/transferpricing-afterbepswhereareweandwhereshould.
pdf. Given the relative consistency of participation in the University of Chicago conference,
in this Part I often assume familiarity with the
excellent Andrus & Oosterhuis paper. Readers
wishing to refresh their memory of formulary
apportionment, RFA and DBRPA as well as some
of the issues that arise with those proposals are
directed to pages 96 to 104 of that paper.
See Michael Devereux, supra note 80.
See Michael Devereux, supra note 80.
Michael C. Durst et al, Allocating Business
Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a
Formulary Profit Split, 9 Fla. Tax Rev. 498, 540–541
(2009).
In contrast, RFA results in a single allocation (or
perhaps a QBU by QBU allocation) of the average
global profits of an entire multinational group.
Unlike RFA, DBRPA would also keep transfer
pricing lawyers and economists productively
employed.
One industry where the difference between
DBRPA and RFA could be important is pharmaceuticals. In that industry more than 40%
of profits globally are generated in the United
States, even though less than 40% of sales occur
here.
Andrus & Oosterhuis, supra note 81, 89–99.
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Cf. Mitchell Kane, Transfer Pricing, Integration,
and Synergy Intangibles: A Consensus Approach
to the Arm’s Length Standard, 6 World Tax J. 282
(2014).
Oosterhuis & Parsons, Destination-Based Income
Taxation: Neither Principled nor Practical?, 71 Tax.
L. Rev. 515 (2018).
Indeed the term “marketing intangible” seems
like a bit of a misnomer to me; the term “market intangible” might be more appropriate.
Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion I use the
term “marketing intangible” because it is the
one that has been used most often in the current
debate.
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 79-285, 1979-2 CB 91.
See, e.g., Reg. §1.167(a)-3 (1960); Gregory Beil,
Internal Revenue Code Section 197: A Cure for the
Controversy Over the Amortization of Acquired
Intangible Assets, 79 U. Miami L. Rev. 731 (1995)
(providing discussion of prior law regulations
and the surrounding case law).
See Tax Treatment on Intangible Assets: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Fin., United States Senate,
on S. 1245, H.R. 3035, and H.R. 4210, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1, 3 (1992) (testimony of Hon. Fred T.
Goldberg, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy,
Department of the Treasury and former IRS
Commissioner) [hereinafter “Hearings”].
Jon D. Kitchel, A Tax Policy Analysis of Recent
Legislative Proposals Regarding the Treatment
of Goodwill, 92 Tax Notes Today 252–289 (Dec.
18, 1992).
U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., Tax Policy: Issues and Policy
Proposals Regarding the Tax Treatment of
Intangible Assets, 10 (1991) (report to the Joint
Committee on Taxation).
Id. It is difficult to understate how serious the
intangible asset categorization problem was
thought to be in the period before the adoption
of Code Sec. 197.
See Hearings, supra note 94.
For the method to function effectively, the transactions associated with a product line will also
need to be accurately delineated. Depending
on policy choices and the facts as issue, the
DBRMPA may more fully import all the complexity associated with determining the appropriate
level of aggregation and accurately delineating
the transactions to be covered that arises in the
transactional profit split method of the current
transfer pricing guidelines than would a pure
DBRPA.
OECD, Revised Guidance on the Application of
the Transactional Profit Split Method: Inclusive
Framework on BEPS: Action 10, OECD/G20 Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, ¶2.123 (2018)
www.oecd.org/tax/beps/revised-guidance-onthe-application-of-the-transactional-profitsplitmethod-beps-action-10.pdf [hereinafter “OECD
Action 10”].
Id. ¶2.127.
Id. ¶2.148.
Robert Guy Matthews & Jeanne Whalen, Glaxo
to Settle Tax Dispute with IRS Over US Unit for
$3.4 Billion, Wall St. J. (Sept. 12, 2006) www.wsj.
com/articles/SB115798715531459461. At the time
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it represented the largest tax dispute in the
history of the Internal Revenue Service, and it
ended when GSK made the largest settlement
payment in history.
News Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS
Accepts Settlement Offer in Largest Transfer
Pricing Dispute (Sept. 11, 2006) www.irs.gov/
newsroom/irs-accepts-settlement-offer-inlargest-transfer-pricing-dispute.
See, e.g., Gareth Green, The U.K. Reaction to the
Glaxo Case, Tax Planning International Transfer
Pricing, BNA (Nov. 2006).
Cf. OECD Action 10, supra note 100, ¶2.127.
(“[W]here the accurate delineation of the
transaction determines that one party to the
transaction performs only simple functions,
does not assume economically significant risks
in relation to the transaction and does not otherwise make any contribution which is unique
and valuable, a transactional profit split method
typically would not be appropriate since a share
of profits … would be unlikely to represent an
arm’s length outcome for such contributions or
risk assumption.”)
Moreover, as the OECD correctly observes in the
context of cost-based profit splitting factors in
a transactional profit split, this approach “can
be very sensitive to differences and changes in
accounting classification of costs. It is therefore
necessary to clearly identify in advance what
costs will be taken into account … and to determine the factor consistently among the parties.”
OECD Action 10, supra note 100, ¶2.182.
The Tax Court resolved part of the recent Amazon
transfer pricing dispute using a technique akin
to the one-sided DBRMPA method I describe
here using a comparable uncontrolled transaction. Unlike in a TNMM, in the Amazon case
all parties agreed that non-routine intangibles
were controlled by both related parties to
the transaction. Nevertheless, Judge Lauber’s
opinion adopted a comparable uncontrolled
transaction methodology for determining the
return that should be attributed to Amazon’s
website technology—the intangibles that would
presumably be considered “production intangibles,” in a DBRMPA, and treated the remainder
of the residual return as allocable to a non-U.S.
party.
Wolfgang Schön, supra note 49, 79–81.
The year 1978 was the high water mark for three
factor apportionment at the state level in the
United States. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, A US
Subnational Perspective on the “Logic” of Taxing
Income on a “Market” Basis, 72 Bull. Intl. Taxn.
4/5 (2018).
See e.g., Charles E. McClure, Jr., The State
Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in Wolves’
Clothing, in The Economics of Taxation (Henry
Aaron & M. Boskin eds., 1980).
See Hellerstein, supra note 110.
For similar reasons, most academic observers
agree that formulary apportionment employed
internationally would probably be implemented
(sooner or later) under a single factor salesbased formulary apportionment system.
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See, e.g., Alan Auerbach et al., Destination-Based
Cash Flow Taxation, Oxford Univ. Ctr. For Bus.
Taxation, Working Paper (Jan. 17, 2017) www.sbs.
ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/
Docs/Publications/Working_Papers/Series_17/
WP1701b.pdf.
See, e.g., Andrus & Oosterhuis, supra note 81, 99.
(“These issues may be novel in the income tax
context, but not in the value-added tax context;
the evolving thinking on these issues in the latter context can thus be a useful guide.”)
In a credit-method VAT, registered businesses
assess tax on taxable goods and services they sell
each time they supply such a good or service to
either a business or a consumer. Registered businesses are then permitted to reduce the amount
of VAT they are liable to remit to the government
by a credit equal to the amount of VAT paid to
other registered businesses in purchasing business inputs (intermediate goods, services, plant
and equipment, etc.). The credit eliminates the
VAT on goods and services used by a registered
business, but leaves in place the VAT on sales to
final consumers. This mechanism ensures that the
consumption of all goods and services subject to
the VAT will be taxed once, but only once, generally at the consumer level. Imposing the VAT on a
destination-basis requires a border adjustment.
To eliminate the tax paid on an exported good by
businesses at earlier stages in the production and
distribution process, exporters receive a credit
(and therefore perhaps a refund) for tax paid on
their inputs in a credit-invoice method system,
while no tax is assessed on their sales.
The VAT mechanism works cross-border and is
not equivalent to a tariff because the VAT credit
mechanism then provides a credit to registered
businesses (and not to consumers). The whole tax
is passed on to consumers; businesses bear none
of it. In contrast, in an income tax, businesses are
intended to pay tax. As a result, the full credit
mechanism is not an option in an income tax.
VAT on imports is generally collected at the
same time as customs duties, although in some
countries collection is postponed until declared
on the importer’s next VAT return.
Of course, income taxes cannot provide expensing treatment in all cases while maintaining
their status as income taxes.
Wa l t e r H e l l e r s t e i n & M i c h a e l K e e n ,
Interjurisdictional Issues in the Design of a VAT,
63 Tax L. Rev. 359 (2010).
See Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The
Promised Pitfalls of Adopting Unitary Formulary
Apportionment, 61 Tax L. Rev. 169, 208 (2008) and
Hellerstein, supra note 110, 9–12, for a discussion
of these issues.
Note also that to solve the problem of determining where globally-provided MNC to MNC
services are “consumed,” most VATs today generally follow the result achieved for purpose of
corporate income tax chargeouts. It is obviously
no answer to rely on the VAT to solve an income
tax problem if the present law VAT solution is
to rely on the income tax answer to solve that
same problem.
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Clausing & Avi-Yonah proposed a look-through
rule for unrelated distributors in their single
sales factor formulary apportionment proposal.
Kim Clausing & Reuven Avi-Yonah, Reforming
Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A
Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment,
Brookings Inst., June 2007.
Andrus & Oosterhuis, supra note 81, 101.
Andrus & Oosterhuis, supra note 81, 100. See
also Harry Grubert, Destination-Based Income
Taxes: A Mismatch Made in Heaven, 69 Tax L. Rev.
43, 55–56 (2015).
Some of these difficulties are discussed in
Grubert, supra note 125, 57.
Cf. OECD Action 10, supra note 100, ¶¶2.154-2.157
(describing the importance of aligning accounting rules in transactional profit splits).
Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The
Promised Pitfalls of Adopting Unitary Formulary
Apportionment, 61 Tax L. Rev. 169, 200 (2008).
Roin’s point was about formulary unitary
taxation, but a close look reveals that most
of the issues are related to unitary taxation
rather than formulary approaches. Julie Roin,
Taxation Without Coordination, 31 J. Legal Stud.
S61, S78–S84 (2002) (detailing institutional
impediments to development of a common
income tax base).
A “one-sided” valuation method DBRMPA
could avoid the problems created by a “twosided” DBRMPA on the one hand and a “formulary” DBRMPA on the other, but in doing so
approaches the result of a DBRPA. It does so
with much more transfer pricing controversy
embedded in order to get to that result.
This idea also has some relationship to proposed special measure number five from the
BEPS project’s 2014 public discussion draft
on Revisions to Chapter I of the Transfer
Pricing Guidelines (Actions 8, 9 and 10). OECD,
Discussion draft on revisions to Chapter I of
the Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Including Risk,
Recharacterisation and Special Measures) (2014)
www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/discussiondraft-actions-8-9-10-chapter-1-TP-Guidelinesrisk-recharacterisation-special-measures.pdf.
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanations
of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue
Proposals (2016).
See, e.g., Dana Trier, International Tax Reform in
a Second Best World: the GILTI Rules (discussion
draft for this conference).
S. Comm. On Finance (minority), 115th Cong.,
Trump’s Tax Law and International Tax: More
Complexity, Loopholes and Incentives to Ship
Jobs Offshore (2018). Note also that the articulated purpose of QBAI was to measure income
from intangibles in an administratively simple
way and exempt non-intangible returns from
GILTI. A key motivating principle for the regime
was that MNCs without high intangible returns
should face an exemption system similar to
those imposed by the countries of residence of
most of their non-U.S. competitors. This policy
rationale is coherent, but it is inapposite in a
multilateral minimum tax regime.
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Trier’s paper also illustrates that a QBAI regime
is not a natural fit with a German-style interest barrier of the type adopted by the United
States in 2017. Trier’s paper correctly treats this
problem as a reason to question why the United
States has chosen to exempt a return measured
as a percentage of QBAI from its minimum tax,
rather than a reason to abandon the Germanstyle interest barrier in favor of [describe Action
4 OECD proposal], which moved forward in the
United States in the 2017 legislative process as
proposed Code Sec. 163(n). In the end, Code Sec.
163(n) was excised from the U.S. legislation as
enacted.
Treasury and the IRS will almost certainly
smooth out many of the rough edges of the 2017
Act in regulations. But the statutory framework
limits their ability to produce a clean system.
Admittedly, as the thorough New York State Bar
Report on the GILTI noted, the current GILTI regime
contains elements of both a flat rate minimum tax
on foreign income and an imperfect add-on to the
prior-law subpart F regime. NYSBA Tax Section,
Report No. 1394 on the GILTI Provisions of the
Code (May 4, 2018), supra note 45. Determining
whether Congress intended to enact a flat rate
minimum tax or an add-on is probably unknowable. What is knowable is that the flat rate theory
has a plausible rationale. In contrast, the GILTI as
an imperfect add-on to the prior subpart F regime
is normatively difficult to defend.
Majority Staff of Permanent Subcomm. On
Investigations, S. Comm. On Homeland Security
and Governmental Affrs., 114th Cong., Impact of
the U.S. Tax Code on the Market for Corporate
Control and Jobs, 2 (2015).
Grinberg Senate Testimony, supra note 43.
Importantly, the result appears to hold even
with formerly U.S.-tax resident corporations
that have substantial presence in the United
States but change their country of tax residency.
Nirupama Rao (formerly part of the Obama
Administration CEA) has shown that former U.S.
MNCs that undertake inversions subsequently
develop higher shares of their employees and
capital expenditures abroad after inversion,
relative to similar firms that remain U.S. tax
resident. Nirupama Rao, Corporate Inversions
and Economic Performance, 68 Nat’l Tax J. 1073
(2015). As Rao’s paper highlights, the changes in
hiring and investment resulting from inversion
are not attributable to the onetime effects on
the data due to the inclusion of the foreign
acquiring firm’s existing workforce and investments. Rather, foreign shares of employment
and investment are systematically higher two
and more years after inversion, relative to the
first year after inversion.
See Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] [German
Income Tax Act], §4j; see also, e.g., EY, German
Parliament adopts legislation on limitation of
tax deduction of royalties and tax exemption
of restructuring gains (May 2, 2017).
See Elodie Lamer, Germany Wants Progress on
BEPS, Minimum Effective Taxation, 91 Tax Notes
Int’l 1246 (Sept. 17, 2018).
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See n. 40–41 and accompanying text.
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Unified Framework for
Fixing Our Broken Tax Code, 9 (2017).
Senate Finance Committee, Explanation of the
Bill, 391 https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/
kpmg/us/pdf/2017/11/tnf-sfc-explanation-ofbill-nov30-2017.pdf.
In an inbound base erosion regime intended
to raise revenue, disaggregation of embedded
intangibles could be required for cross-border
payments associated with the supply in the
United States of any good or service. Huge
pressure would then exist for regulations
attempting such a disaggregation to avoid
overbreadth.
It may be that such an agreement could not be
reached with the EU in advance of March 29,
2019, the date for which Brexit is scheduled. Note
also that from a U.S. perspective what would
be important would be for an agreed defensive
measure to be applied by all EU member states
at the external EU border. If freedom of establishment constraints prevented application of a
defensive measure by EU sovereigns in regard
of payments to other EU member states, that
limitation would not raise any fundamental U.S.
policy concern.
Importantly, so long as the inbound minimum
tax is intended as a defensive measure rather
than a meaningful revenue raiser, principled
answers with respect to the currently intractable
problems raised by embedded intangibles and
foreign corporations with no taxable nexus
under current standards are simply not necessary. Given the technical challenges raised by
these two issues, the ability to avoid them is a
significant advantage.
In the case of Germany, an important question
also arises as to whether there should be a commitment to block EU-level digital-only solutions.
More generally, the points above about coordination as to minimum standards for an outbound minimum tax regime would not require
agreement as to all the details of the inbound
minimum taxes (defensive measures) enacted
by individual countries that are intended to
backstop the outbound minimum tax regime.
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy 27 (1994). Not only
was the United States the only country with the
economic might to organize the international
tax system of the capitalist world—its capacity
to dictate international tax rules was part of a
broader reality in which, in the Cold War period,
the United States in effect organized most
aspects of the economic and military structure
of the noncommunist developed world. U.S.
tax leadership, like U.S. political and economic
leadership more broadly, was accepted in large
part because of a threat the developed noncommunist world perceived; namely that without
U.S. leadership the world might fall under Soviet
domination.
Alternatively, one could perhaps imagine
deemed presence rules combined with some
minimum distributor-type returns meant to
apply to all businesses. As with a formulary
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DBRMPA system, the principles underlying such
a system and the international law sources that
would stabilize it and ensure that any agreement

would be respected are not clear. However,
unlike a DBRMPA system, such a system (which
arguably builds on Wolfgang Schön’s digital

investment concept could potentially be bolted
on to the existing bilateral tax treaty system. C.f.
n. 109 and accompanying text, supra.
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